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PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN NEW JERSEY:
AN INDISPENSABLE SAFEGUARD IN THE
CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCESS
Joseph H. Rodriguez*
Michael L. Perlin**
John M. Apicella***
I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 4, 1983, at about 11:00 p.m. in Texas, James D. Autry, one
of the approximately 1300 inmates' housed on death row i'n America, lay

t The authors gratefully acknowledge the aid and assistance of Catherine A.
Hanssens, Esq., Assistant Deputy Public Defender; and Ms. Francine A. Lee, Legal
Secretary, New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate.
* Commissioner, New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate, Public
Defender, Trenton, New Jersey.
** Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B. 1966, Rutgers
University; J.D. 1969, Columbia University School of Law. The author was formerly
Special Counsel to the Commissioner, Department of the Public Advocate, Trenton, N.J.
*** Assistant Deputy Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Appellate
Section, East Orange, New Jersey.
1. As of March 1, 1984, according to records kept by the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc., there were 1311 inmates on death row as follows:
RACES
State
Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas

No.
71
50
23

California
Colorado
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho

153
2
6
203
114
9

Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky

59
25
19

Native
Method of
Black White Hisp. American Asian Unkn
Execution
47
24
Electrocution
5
39
5
1
Gas Chamber
8
14
1
Lethal Injection (or
choice of electrocution
if sentenced before
3/24/83)
56
65 25
4
3
Gas Chamber
2
Gas Chamber
3
3
Lethal Injection
83 115
5
Electrocution
54
60
Electrocution
8
1
Lethal Injection or
Firing Squad
33
22
4
Lethal Injection
11
14
Electrocution
2
17
Electrocution
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strapped to a hospital gurney, intravenous tubes in place in his right arm,
waiting for the lethal gas mixture to begin its deadly flow.2 At the last
RACES
State
Louisiana
Maryland
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Washington

No.

Native
BlackWhite Hisp. American As ian Unkn

19

1
3

I
I
I

I

Method of
Execution
Electrocution
Gas Chamber
Gas Chamber
Gas Chamber
Hanging or
Lethal Injection
Electrocution
Lethal Injection
Lethal Injection
Lethal Injection
Electrocution
Lethal Injection
Electrocution
Lethal Injection
Electrocution
Electrocution
Electrocution
Lethal Injection
Firing Squad
Electrocution
Hanging or
Lethal Injection
Gas Chamber

Wyoming
3
Connecticut
0
Massachusetts
0
New Hampshire
0
South Dakota
0
Vermont
0
TOTAL
1311
12
7
2
555 669 66
(Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, West Virginia and Wisconsin have no
death penalty.)
2. New Jersey is one of six states which have enacted statutes adopting lethal
injection as the approved method of execution. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:49-1 to -12
(West Supp. 1984-1985). However, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has yet
to look into this practice. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia recently held that the FDA's refusal to investigate this unapproved use of
approved drugs is an arbitrary and capricious refusal to exercise its regulatory jurisdiction. Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
3532 (1984).
Inasmuch as the FDA admitted that it had jurisdiction over all state laws "that
purport[] to legitimize the lawful shipment of an unapproved drug in interstate commerce, or that purportf] to permit its misbranding after shipment," the Chaney majority determined that the FDA must have jurisdiction here, where the state's lethal
injection laws purport to mandate the use of certain prescription drugs for a purpose
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instant,3 United States Supreme Court Justice Byron R. White stayed Autry's
execution,' pending the Court's decision in Pulley v. Harris.5 In Pulley, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the United States Constitution requires state appellate review of state-imposed death sentences to determine if such sentences are disproportionate to sentences imposed on others convicted of similar crimes. Thus, "proportionality" became the point upon which
new battle lines were drawn by those charged with the duty of representing mostly
indigent defendants charged with capital crimes."
not listed on their label. 718 F.2d at 1182. The majority rejected the argument that
state-sanctioned use of certain prescription drugs for lethal injections, a purpose not
listed on their labels, comes within the "practice-of-medicine" exemption of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). The court ruled that the agency's
failure to meet its statutory responsibility was sufficient to invalidate the FDA's inaction, warning that this failure "may well place constitutionally impermissible burdens
on the eighth amendment rights of appellants." Id. at 1192.
The mandate in Chaney was stayed by the United States Supreme Court, pending
the government's application for a writ of certiorari. See O'Bryan v. McKaskle, 729
F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1984) (denying O'Bryan's action for relief based upon 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Chaney decision. The court noted Chief Justice Burger's stay of the
mandate of Chaney, id. at 993, and denied the application for a stay of execution.).
O'Bryan's petition for emergency relief based on Chaney was denied by the Supreme
Court. O'Bryan v. Heckler, 104 S. Ct. 1698 (1984).
3. To Die or Not to Die, Newsweek, Oct. 17, 1983, at 43 [hereinafter cited
as To Die]. Two days before Autry's scheduled execution, in an unsigned five to four
opinion, the Supreme Court denied a stay of execution even though Autry still had
a month within which to file a petition for certiorari from the denial of his federal
habeas corpus petition below. Autry v. Estelle, 104 S. Ct. 20 (1983). See also infra
note 4. This was the first time that the Supreme Court had refused to stay an execution
where the condemned had not filed at least one Supreme Court appeal. Previously,
stays had been so routinely granted at this stage that the Texas Attorney General's
office did not oppose Autry's application. See Greenhouse, A New Angrier Mood on
Death Penalty Appeals, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1983, at A22, col. 3. Following the
Supreme Court's reversal of Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984), Autry once again
petitioned the Supreme Court for a stay of execution. This petition was denied. Autry
v. McKaskle, 104 S. Ct. 1462 (1984).
4. The Supreme Court's unprecedented denial of the stay led to frantic last
ditch efforts culminating in Justice White's order staying the execution on papers handwritten on a yellow legal pad. To Die, supra note 3, at 43. See Barefoot v. Estelle,
103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983) (approving procedure by which the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals expedites the prosecution of habeas corpus appeals so that the merits may
be considered at the same time as the application for a stay of execution). However,
expedited appellate procedures are not always in the best interest of condemned
appellants, and have been characterized as an unseemly "rush to kill." Why the Rush
to Kill?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1983, at A30 (editorial). See Maggio v. Williams, 104
S. Ct. 311, 317 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Court's approach
as displaying "an unseemly and unjustified eagerness to allow the state to proceed
with Williams' execution").
5. 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
6. See generally Sherrill, Death Row on Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1983,
(Magazine), at 80. Sherrill's article focuses on Florida's death row population, and
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The requirement of proportionality in sentencing, founded on the eighth
amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishments, 7 appeared
to rest on firm ground.8 The words of Chief Justice Burger that "[t]he signals
from this Court ...

have not always been easy to decipher,"' however, proved

true again. Despite solid precedent to the contrary,'" the Court denied the
existence of a federal constitutional right to proportionality review of death
sentences." Indeed, less than a month after staying Autry's Texas death
sentence pending its decision in Pulley, the Supreme Court vacated a stay
previously granted in a Louisiana case raising virtually the identical issue."
contends that white, affluent prisoners have the greatest likelihood of avoiding the
death penalty.
7. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments in the eighth amendment is the foundation for the principle of proportionality, which mandates that the
punishment "fit the crime." Thus, a disproportionate punishment is "cruel and
unusual." See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Another aspect of proportionality, however, requires that similarly-situated
offenders receive similar punishments. This is the principle of comparative proportionality, which finds its support in the equal protection clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Under traditional equal protection analysis, the infringement of
the right to life, a fundamental right, must be justified by a compelling state interest.
While the penological purposes of deterrence and retribution may arguably constitute
compelling state interests, "neither deterrence nor retribution can justify a capital sentencing system which results in different sentences for similarly situated capital defendants." Goodpaster, JudicialReview of Death Sentences, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRMNOLOGY
786, 802 (1983). Thus, according to Goodpaster, the constitutional requirement of equal
protection mandates comparative proportionality review. Only proportionality review
would expose instances of the unfair imposition of the death penalty for crimes which
juries normally treat less harshly.
8. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983) (sentence of life imprison-

ment for passing "no account" check found "significantly disproportionate" despite
defendant's prior convictions); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty
cruel and unusual punishment for one convicted of felony murder who did not actually
kill victim); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596-97 (1977) (death penalty cruel and

unusual punishment for rape conviction).
9. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978).
10. Indeed, in Proffitt v. Florida, a plurality of the Court had complimented
the Florida courts for performing a proportionality review "with a maximum of
rationality and consistency," even though such review was not mandated by the Florida
statute. 428 U.S. 242, 258-59 (1976). The Court noted approvingly that the Florida

Supreme Court "has several times compared the circumstances of a case under review
with those of previous cases in which it has assessed the imposition of death sentences.

By following this procedure the Florida court has in effect adopted the type of proportionality review mandated by the Georgia statute." Id. at 259 (citations omitted). See
also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (decided on the same day as Proffitt).
11. Pulley, 104 S. Ct. at 879.
12. Maggio v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 311 (1983). In Maggio, the Supreme Court

noted that it had previously agreed to decide whether the proportionality review of
death sentences is mandated by the Constitution, but nevertheless refused to stop the
execution of Williams, vacating a previous stay granted by the Fifth Circuit. Id. at
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Ten weeks later, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Pulley, holding
that the federal Constitution contained no requirement that the individual states
must conduct proportionality review of capital sentences." While the ruling
in Pulley further limits the range of federal relief open to the condemned,
it serves to underscore the importance of New Jersey's statutorily required
proportionality review," and of the New Jersey Constitution as a guarantor
of proportionality review, both through the constitution's "cruel and unusual
punishments" clause' 5 and through the broad powers vested in the New Jersey
Supreme Court to act as a "court of last resort."'" The New Jersey Supreme
Court has long been a leader in affording state citizens greater protection under
the state constitution than that mandated under parallel provisions of the federal
Constitution.' 7
314-15. The court of appeals had concluded that a stay was necessary because it
anticipated that the Supreme Court in Pulley would undertake a complete review of
the law of proportionality review. Id. at 312-13. The Maggio Court distinguished
Williams' situation from that of Autry's by the fact that Williams' sentence had
undergone proportionality review in the district court while Autry's sentence never
received a proportionality review. The Supreme Court's conclusion that Williams' proportionality claim, which was almost identical to that raised in Pulley, did not warrant
a stay of his execution was a clear signal that the anticipated decision in Pulley would
not be a welcome one for those advocates battling for the lives of their condemned
clients. Williams was executed on December 14, 1983.
13. In Pulley, the Court held that even though proportionality review is an
important element of meaningful appellate review of death sentences, it is not a constitutionally indispensable element, 104 S.Ct. at 879. See infra notes 40-82 and accompanying text.
14. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3e (West 1982) ("Every judgment of conviction
which results in a sentence of death under this section may be appealed . . .to the
Supreme Court, which shall also determine whether the sentence is disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.").
15. N.J. CONST., art. I, para. 12 (West 1971).
16. N.J. CoNrs., art. VI, § 2, para. 2 (West 1971).

17. For examples of this "more expansive grant of rights," see, e.g., State v.
Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 216, 463 A.2d 320, 323 (1983) (search and seizure); Right to
Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 301, 450 A.2d 925, 931-32 (1982) (medicaid funding
of abortions); In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 249, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (1981) (privacy); State
v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 555, 423 A.2d 615, 625 (1980) (free speech), appealdismissed
and cert. denied sub nom. Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); State v.
Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 112-13, 405 A.2d 368, 374 (1979) (zoning); Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 174-75, 336 A.2d 713,

725 (zoning), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), modified and
enforced, 161 N.J. Super. 317, 391 A.2d 935 (1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983). Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 490, 303 A.2d
273, 282 (education), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973). See generally Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977)
(Justice Brennan argues in support of states granting more rights under their state

constitution); Pollock, State Constitutions as SeparateSources of FundamentalRights,
35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1983) (stressing the need for state courts to rely on their
state constitutions as a way to afford greater protection of basic fundamental rights

to its citizens); Note, The New Jersey Supreme Court'sInterpretationand Application
of the State Constitution, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 491 (1984).
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The impact of Pulley is not merely academic. Within days of the Pulley
decision, the New Jersey State Prosecutor's Association called for the repeal
of that portion of the state death penalty statute mandating proportionality
review,' characterizing the provision as "needless" and "unnecessary.""
Although that repeal has not yet taken place,"0 and although there are certain
critical distinctions between the California statutory scheme upheld in Pulley
and the New Jersey statute,2 this prosecutorial attitude requires a careful
examination of both the Pulley decision and its expected impact on New Jersey
practice.
Full examination of the Pulley case, its antecedents, the constitutional
history of proportionality and sentence review, and the general role of the
appellate judiciary in New Jersey will reveal three principles: (1) repeal of proportionality review in New Jersey is not mandated by Pulley; (2) repeal would
be contrary to the heritage of both state case law and constitutional
developments, as the concept of proportionality is deeply embedded in the
fabric of the state's legal system; and (3) repeal would be contrary to the notion
of fundamental fairness which is an essential element of the state's criminal
justice system.
II.
A.

Pulley

AND ITS ANTECEDENTS

The Law Before Pulley

The United States Supreme Court recognized the principle of proportionality as an inherent component of the eighth amendment's proscription
against cruel and unusual punishments long before the current debate began.
The first Supreme Court opinion addressing the concept of proportionality
within the ambit of the eighth amendment was Weems v. United States.2 In
Weems, a dispensing officer for the Coast Guard was convicted in a Phillipine
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3e.
19. See Schwaneberg, ProsecutorsSeek Death Law Revision, Newark Star-Ledger,
Feb. 7, 1984, at 20, col. 5.
20. No vote has yet been taken on S. 1479, which would eliminate the proportionality requirement in New Jersey. See Schwaneberg, Senate Panel Debates Measure
to Eliminate Review of Death Sentences, Newark Star-Ledger, Apr. 26, 1984, at 21,
col. 1. The Department of the Public Advocate testified at the hearing in opposition
to the bill, characterizing the proportionality requirement as "an indispensable device
[to ensure] fairness and consistency in the application of our death penalty statute." Id.
21. For discussion of the California statute, see infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
22. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). See White, Disproportionalityand the Death Penalty:
Death as a Punishment for Rape, 38 U. PITT. L. REV. 145 (1976); Note, "Down the

Road Toward Human Decency": Eighth Amendment ProportionalityAnalysis and
Solem v. Helm, 18 GA. L. REV. 109, 115 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Human
Decency]; Note, Disproportionalityand the Death Penalty in Rape Cases, 38 U. PITT.
L. REV. 145 (1976).
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court of falsifying his cash book outlays. 23 The court sentenced the officer
to fifteen years of cadena temporal - imprisonment at hard labor and permanent deprivation of specific basic rights such as property ownership.2 4 In
striking down the statute, the Supreme Court compared Weems' punishment
with the sanctions imposed by other jurisdictions for the same crime and with
sanctions imposed in the same and other jurisdictions for more serious crimes. 25
In two more recent opinions, the Court focused on the importance of
comparative proportionality review in the context of death penalty statutes.
In Gregg v. Georgia,2 6 the statute in question provided for state supreme court
review, requiring that court to examine whether the sentence was disproportionate when compared with sentences imposed in similar cases. The Court
made special note of this "important additional safeguard" 2 and viewed it
as a "check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty." 28
The Court stated:
In particular, the proportionality review substantially eliminates the
possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an
aberrant jury. If a time comes when juries generally do not impose
the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review
procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of death.29
In Proffitt v. Florida,30 the Court scrutinized a statutory provision which
mandated automatic review 3 ' but did not specify the form of review which
the Florida Supreme Court was to conduct. As the United States Supreme
Court observed, the Supreme Court of Florida "considers its function to be
to '[guarantee] that the [aggravating and mitigating] reasons present in one
case will reach a similar result to that reached under similar circumstances
in another case .....
, The plurality opinion in Proffitt highlighted the proportionality review as evidence that "the Florida court has undertaken responsibly to perform its function of death sentence review with a maximum of
rationality and consistency." 3 3 The Court focused on this part of the review

23. 217 U.S. at 357, 362-63.
24. Id. at 364-65.
25. Id. at 377-80.

26.
27.
28.
29.

428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Id.at 198.
Id.at 206.
Id.

30. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
31. Id. at 250-51.

32. Id.at 251 (citing State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973)).
33. Id. at 259. But see Radelet & Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court and
Death Penalty Appeals, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 913, 926 (1983) ("[I]t
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process again, stating that "[the] reasons [for the death sentence], and the
evidence supporting them, are conscientiously reviewed by a court which,
because of its statewide jurisdiction, can assure consistency, fairness, and
rationality in the even-handed operation of the state law." 3 Certainly, the
significance which the Supreme Court has assigned to proportionality review
as an effective measure in eliminating comparatively excessive death sentences
is ample reason for its inclusion in a state statute intended "to cover every
possible contingency for the protection of the defendant."" Indeed, the
Supreme Court itself has utilized a form of proportionality review in its disposition of challenged death sentences.36
Although the Supreme Court failed specifically to address the proportionality issue for fifty years following Weems, individual states filled this
gap through constitutional and statutory provisions designed to protect their
citizens from excessive sentences. 7 This protection frequently took the form
of statutes which, in effect, provided appellate courts with the power to modify
excessive sentences. 8 The absence of clearly articulated majority opinions in
almost all of the Supreme Court's more recent death penalty cases has frustrated
attempts to identify exactly what the federal Constitution requires.39 Particularly
in a situation where a life may hang in the balance, it is necessary for state
courts to respond to the Court's mixed messages in a manner which affords
its citizens the benefit of any constitutional doubts.
B.

The Pulley Decision

Robert Alton Harris was sentenced to death under California's capital
punishment statute,"' following his conviction on two counts of first degree
murder.' On appeal to the state supreme court, he argued that the statute
was unconstitutional for the reason that it failed to require the California
Supreme Court to compare his sentence with those imposed in similar capital
is clear that either the state supreme court or, in its opinion, the trial courts are not
applying the death penalty consistently in Florida.") (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 259-60 (emphasis added). Of course, this "statewide" perspective essential to assuring proportionate sentencing is absent from an isolated jury
determination.
35. Goodpaster, supra note 7. According to Goodpaster, the Supreme Court
implicitly provides support for the requirement of proportionality review. Id. at 796-97.
36. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420 (1980); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
37. See Note, Human Decency, supra note 22, at 117-19.
38. Id. at 119 n.34.
39. Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO. L.J. 97,
99-100 (1979).
40. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.6 (West 1977), repealed by CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 190-190.7 (West 1984).
41. Pulley, 104 S.Ct. at 873 n.l. Harris was also convicted of robbery and
kidnapping.
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cases. This argument was rejected by the state court,4 2 as was his state habeas
43
corpus application.

Harris' federal habeas claim was rejected in the federal district court. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed the necessity and the scope of proportionality review." The court granted Harris a stay based on two grounds: first,
that California case law indicated that the California Supreme Court would
undertake a proportionality review in every death case;"5 and, second, that
Gregg and Proffitt required a proportionality review."' The Ninth Circuit
instructed the district court to vacate the sentence unless the California Supreme
Court conducted a proportionality review within
120 days47 and reached a
48
Gregg.
and
Proffitt
with
consistent
decision
4 9
The United States Supreme Court granted the state's certiorari petition
0
and reversed in Pulley v. Harris."
After rejecting Harris' argument that the
case could properly be returned to the state courts "because state law may
entitle him to the comparative proportionality review that he has unsuccessfully
demanded," 5' the Court moved on to the federal constitutional question.
Attempting to "more clearly identify the issue" 52 before it, the Court
distinguished "death penalty proportionality" 53 from "traditional
42. People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 623 P.2d. 240, 171 Cal. Rptr. 679, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 882 (1981).
43. Harris v. California, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982).
44. Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
871, on remand, 726 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1984).
45. Id. at 1196. The court cited People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d
587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979), and People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d. 264, 618 P.2d
149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981).
46. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text. The court noted that California's death penalty statute, like Florida's, provides for automatic appeal to the state
supreme court without defining the type of review the court must conduct. 692 F.2d
at 1193-93.
47. Id. at 1196. The court did not provide clear guidelines to the district court
on how to examine the state's proportionality review. The court did give the following
helpful advice: "It must be recognized, however, that given the broad range of considerations relevant in determining whether to impose the death penalty, any statistical
showing based on a particular selection of 'similar' cases may not be conclusive of
the usual practice." 692 F.2d at 1196-97.
48. Id. at 1192. This decision is in conflict with the decisions of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which has consistently upheld district-wide rather than state-wide
review. See Baldwin v. Maggio, 715 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1983); Williams v. Maggio,
679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982), aff'd, 103 S. Ct. 3553 (1983).
49. Pulley v. Harris, 103 S. Ct. 1425 (1983).
50. 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).

51. Id. at 875. The Court held that "[a] federal court may not issue the writ
on the basis of a perceived error of state law." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1976)).
52. Id.
53. The Court stated "this sort of proportionality review presumes that the death
sentence is not disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense. It purports to
inquire whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because
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proportionality," 5 ' and posed the following question: "whether the Eighth
Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
requires a state appellate court, before it affirms a death sentence, to compare
the sentence in the case before it with the penalties imposed in similar cases
if requested to do so by the prisoner.''"
The Court then reviewed the recent history of death penalty litigation,
focusing upon the 1976 trilogy of cases 6 which upheld three state statutes
drafted in response to Furman v. Georgia.17 In Furman, the Court held that
the death penalty as then administered was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual
by federal constitutional standards. 8 The Court in Pulley cautioned that
although "[m]ost" state statutes require the reviewing court to determine
whether a sentence is disproportionate," and although some state courts perform proportionality review despite the absence of a statutory requirement,
6
such review is not necessarily indispensable. 1
While the opinions in Gregg greatly emphasized statutorily required proportionality review, 6 and the Pulley Court characterized such review as "an
additional safeguard against arbitrary or capricious sentencing," 62 the Court
found that it was not "so critical that without it the Georgia statute would
not have passed constitutional muster." 63 The essential element of propordisproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime."
Id. at 876. See supra note 7.
54. This analysis can be abstracted from the following quote:
Traditionally, "proportionality" has been used with reference to an abstract
evaluation of the appropriateness of a sentence for a particular crime. Looking to the gravity of the offense and the severity of the penalty, to sentences
imposed for other crimes, and to sentencing practices in other jurisdictions,
this Court has occasionally struck down punishments as inherently disproportionate, and therefore cruel and unusual, when imposed for a particular crime
or category of crime.
Id. at 875 (citing, inter alia, Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983)). The Court noted
that the death penalty "is not in all cases a disproportionate penalty in this sense."
104 S. Ct. at 875 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (Stewart, J.)).
55. 104 S. Ct. at 876.
56. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
57. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
58. Id. at 240-41.

59. 104 S. Ct. at 876. According to a recent study, over 30 states require some
sort of proportionality review. Goodpaster, supra note 7, at 793 n.61.
60. 104 S. Ct. at 876.
61. Id. at 877 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198, 204-06, 222-23).
62. Id. at 879.
63. Id. The Court went on to note that in Jurek, it upheld a death sentence
based on neither statutory nor caselaw mechanisms for proportionality review, but
which otherwise "provided a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences under law." Id. at 878 (quoting Jurek, 428 U.S.
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tionality review identified in Gregg and Proffitt was "the provision of some
sort of prompt and automatic appellate review." 6 ' The Court thus found no
basis in its decisional law "for holding that comparative proportionality review
by an appellate court is required in every case in which the death penalty is
imposed and the defendant requests it." 6
Finally, the Court scrutinized the entire California statute, assuming that
there could be a capital sentencing system so lacking in other checks on
arbitrariness that it could not pass constitutional muster without comparative
proportionality review. 66 After a detailed examination of the full statutory
scheme, 67 including the necessity of separate determinations as to the presence
of special 6 or aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 9 the Court concluded
that the statute sufficiently guided jury discretion, decreased the chance of
arbitrary infliction of the death penalty, and guaranteed that jury decisions
be principled and deliberate. 7" As the jury's "discretion [was thus] suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action," 7' the Court determined that it could not "say that the California
procedures provided Harris inadequate protection against the evil identified
in Furman."72
Justice Stevens concurred, relying on Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek for the
proposition that "the case law does establish that appellate review plays an
essential role in eliminating the systemic arbitrariness and capriciousness which
infected death penalty schemes invalidated by Furman v. Georgia and hence
that some form of meaningful appellate review is constitutionally required." 73
at 276). Under such a scheme, proportionality review "would have been constitutionally
superfluous." 104 S.Ct. at 879. But see Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative
Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 728 (1983) (Georgia system continues to uphold death sentences
identified as presumptively excessive; "[tihe Georgia Supreme Court has never vacated
a death sentence imposed in a murder case on the grounds that it was excessive or
disproportionate because of the infrequency of death sentencing among similar cases.").
64. 104 S. Ct. at 879.
65. Id. The Court also rejected Harris' argument that its most recent decision
in Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983), compelled a mandatory proportionality
finding. While Zant did stress the importance of mandatory appellate review under
the Georgia statute, id. at 2742, the focus of its holding was "on the constitutionally
necessary narrowing function of statutory aggravating circumstances." Pulley, 104 S.
Ct. at 879. Again, proportionality review was characterized merely as an "additional
safeguard against arbitrarily imposed death sentences." Id.
66. 104 S.Ct. at 880.
67. Id. at 880-81 and nn.13-14.
68. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.2 (West 1983). The "special circumstances" are
listed in Pulley, 104 S.Ct. at 880 n.13.
69. CAL. PENAL CODE §190.3. These circumstances are listed in Pulley, 104 S.
Ct. at 880 n.14.
70. 104 S.Ct. at 881 (citing Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d at 1194-95).
71. Id. (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189).
72. 104 S. Ct. at 881.
73. Id. at 881-82 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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In a sharply-worded dissent, Justice Brennan, writing for himself and Justice
Marshall, repeated his view that the death penalty is invariably cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth and fourteenth amendments.74
Justice Brennan also focused his attention specifically on the proportionality
issue:
Upon the available evidence . ..I am convinced that the Court is
simply deluding itself, and also the American public, when it insists
that those defendants who have already been executed or are today
condemned to death have been selected on a basis that is neither
arbitrary nor capricious, under any meaningful definition of those
terms."
Justice Brennan characterized the concerns articulated in Furman as
premised on actual experience with the administration of the penalty by the
various states:7 6 "if any principle is an accepted part of the Court's death
penalty decisions during the past 12 years, it is that the irrational application
of the death penalty, as evidenced by examination of when the death penalty
is actually imposed, cannot be constitutionally defended." 77
Justice Brennan also noted that several factors contribute to the "irrationality" which currently surrounds the imposition of the death penalty. 78
First, Justice Brennan reviewed the "rapidly expanding body of literature"
on "systemic racial discrimination" in the administration of the death penalty,
and concluded that the race of the defendant and of the victim are crucial
but impermissible considerations in capital sentencing. 79 Moreover, gender,
socio-economic status and intrastate geographical location may also be sources
of arbitrariness."0 According to Justice Brennan:
[I]f the Court is going to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities, then
it cannot sanction continued executions on the unexamined assumption that the death penalty is being administered in a rational, nonarbitrary, and noncapricious manner. Simply to assume that the procedural protections mandated by this Court's prior decisions eliminate
the irrationality underlying application of the death penalty is to ignore
the holding of Furman and whatever constitutional difficulties may
be inherent in each State's death penalty system.'
74. Id. at 884 n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring) and Gregg, 428 U.S. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
75. 104 S. Ct. at 885 (Brennan J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 886 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 887 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 888 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. Id.

1984]

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN NEW JERSEY

Since proportionality review serves to eliminate some of the irrationality that
infects the current imposition of death sentences throughout the various states,
Justice Brennan concluded that comparative proportionality review is thus mandated by the federal Constitution. 2
C.

The Impact of Pulley on New Jersey Capital Jurisprudence

Nothing in Pulley suggests or requires the elimination of proportionality
review in the New Jersey capital punishment system. First, and most important, the fact that proportionality review may not be mandated by the federal
Constitution does not decide the question of whether the New Jersey Constitution imposes such an obligation. 3 This is a critical distinction in a state
such as New Jersey, where the state supreme court has established a variety
of protections under the state charter that far exceeds federal constitutional
requirements.8 4 Second, Pulley itself is inconsistent with the Court's prior death
penalty jurisprudence. The Pulley majority relied on a distorted reading of
5
the Court's conclusions in Gregg v. Georgia."
While acknowledging the
importance of comparative proportionality review in both the plurality and
concurring opinions in Gregg, the Pulley Court asserted that this review was
actually "considered an additional safeguard against arbitrary or capricious
sentencing."86 As noted above, 7 the Court's sudden demotion to "secondary"
importance of the Gregg proportionality review can hardly be justified by a
careful reading of Gregg.
The Supreme Court itself has engaged in proportionality review to ensure
a fair result. The Court has compared the sentence in question with penalties
provided for similar statutory offenses in other jurisdictions and with penalties
provided for more serious statutory offenses in the same jurisdiction." In
82. Id. Justice Brennan focused on proportionality review as a mechanism designed
to root out the case of the defendant "whose crime does not seem so aggravated when
compared to those of many who escaped the death penalty." Id. at 889 (quoting Kaplan,
The Problem of Capital Punishment, 1983 U. ILL. L.F. 555, 576). He noted that the
"best evidence" of the value of proportionality review is the recognition that in Georgia
(where proportionality review is statutorily mandated, see GA. CODE ANN. §
17-10-35(c)(3) (1984)), at least seven death sentences have been vacated because that
state's supreme court "was convinced that they were comparatively disproportionate."
104 S. Ct. at 890-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing cases from Georgia and eight
other states whose supreme courts have vacated death sentences as a result of required
proportionality review). Pulley is criticized sharply in Special Project, CapitalPunishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 1129, 1198-1201 (1984).
83. See Special Project: The Constitutionalityof the Death Penalty in New Jersey,
15 RUTGERS L.J. 261, 310-24 (1984).
84. See Special Project, supra note 83, at 323-24.
85. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
86. 104 S.Ct. at 877 (emphasis added).
87. See supra note 63.
88. See supra note 8.
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addition, the Court has considered the extent to which juries actually apply
the death penalty, evaluating whether the sentence is at variance with what
society apparently feels is just.89 The Court's willingness to dismiss comparative
proportionality review as merely an option in state court proceedings is ironic
in light of these decisions.
Third, Pulley does not retreat from Zant v. Stephens,9" or any of the
Court's line of cases which affirms the central focus of Furman as restated
in Gregg: "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave
as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk
of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.""' This inquiry - a determination
of the degree of risk of "wholly arbitrary and capricious action" - remains
an ongoing concern. Under no circumstances should Pulley be seen as the
death knell of United States Supreme Court proportionality analysis. As Professor Martin Shapiro recently noted:
Coker v. Georgia, striking down the death penalty as a punishment
for rape, however, shows us that equality is not the value at play.
Instead, the value appears to be some sort of Aristotelian proportionality. The Court dons the robes of the Mikado to decide when
the punishment fits the crime. It feels in its bones that rape is not
serious enough to warrant the death penalty." 2
The Coker decision9 3 demonstrates that the Court has employed proportionality
review to strike down particular punishments for particular crimes, e.g., the
death penalty for rape. Having done so, the Court leaves open the continuing
possibility that it will find certain crime/punishment relationships to be per
se disproportionate and violative of the eighth amendment.
Finally, the Court stressed that its decision was premised on the fact that
the Californiastatute included other checks on arbitrariness."' The Court did
89. See White, supra note 22, at 159; Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment:
The Taming of the Proportionality Test, 7 RUTGERS L.J. 722, 723 (1976).
90. 103 S. Ct. 2733 (1983).

91. Id. at 2741 (Stewart, J.) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189).
92. Shapiro, Fathersand Sons: The Court, The Commentators and the Search
for Values, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 236 (V.
Blasi ed. 1983) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

93. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
94. The Supreme Court noted that under the California statute, capital murder

was limited to those cases where the state proved, at the guilt phase, the existence
of one or more "special circumstances" which greatly reduced the number of defendants eligible for the sentencing phase. The Court noted:

By requiring the jury to find at least one special circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt, the statute limits the death sentence to a small sub-class
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not eliminate the possibility that a statute lacking proportionality review will
ever be invalidated under the federal Constitution, but merely concluded that
the constitutionality of this statute - like the statutes upheld in Gregg, Proffitt
and Jurek - was not dependent on the presence or absence of a comparative
review provision." Nothing in Pulley suggests that the Court will not decide
in the future that a New Jersey law lacking proportionality review does not
sufficiently reduce the risk of arbitrariness condemned in Furman so as to
be unconstitutional under federal standards.96
III.

A.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN NEW JERSEY

An Historical Perspective

The phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" first appeared in the English
Declaration of Rights of 1689 as an indirect result of the ascension of William
and Mary to the throne of England.97 The unsteady reign of King James II
ended in December of 1688 when the King, under attack by William of Orange
and his forces, threw the great seal of England into the Thames and fled to
France.9" In response to the "selective or irregular application of harsh
penalties" 99 imposed during James' reign, the English Bill of Rights was drafted
and ratified by the new monarchy of William and Mary. It contained the
of capital-eligible cases. The statutory list of relevant factors, applied to defendants within this sub-class, "provide[sl jury guidance and lessen[s] the chance
of arbitrary application of the death penalty."
104 S. Ct. at 881 (citations omitted). By contrast, the New Jersey statute does not
attempt to define capital and non-capital murder. Since the New Jersey death penalty
statute is otherwise "substantially identical" to the Georgia statute approved in Gregg,
including a statutorily mandated proportionality review, it can hardly be said that this
statutory requirement is suddenly "unnecessary."
95. 104 S.Ct. at 881.
96. Note, Furman v. Georgia - Deathknell for Capital Punishment?, 47 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 107, 109-10 & n.28 (1972).
97. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 852-53 (1969). See generally Furman, 408 U.S. at
242-43 (Douglas, J., concurring).
98. Granucci, supra note 97, at 853 n.61 (citing R. PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 4 (1959)).
99. Id. at 853-56. James II ascended the throne after his brother Charles II died
in February, 1685. Charles' eldest illegitimate son, James, Duke of Monmouth, led
an invasion force which landed in England on June 11, 1685. Monmouth proclaimed
himself King and led a brief rebellion which lasted about a month before he was captured and executed. The King set about to prosecute the captured rebels swiftly. Towards
that end, mass plea-bargaining was employed in which all those who pleaded guilty
would be spared execution; the penalty for treason was to be carted to the gallows,
hanged by the neck, cut down while still alive, disembowelled, with the entrails burnt
before the condemned who was then beheaded and quartered. See also Furman, 408
U.S. at 253-55 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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following clause: "That excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive
fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."' °
While many legal commentators generally agreed that the phrase "cruel
and unusual punishments" was created as a reaction to the reign of terror
of 1685 (the Bloody Assize)," ° ' another view emerged. What was to be condemned as "cruel and unusual" was not merely barbarous punishments, but
also sentences which were cruel because they were disproportionately severe
compared to the gravity of the crime committed. 0 " On June 12, 1776, Virginia
adopted a Declaration of Rights which included verbatim the cruel and unusual
punishments prohibition of the English Bill of Rights of 1689.03 In 1791, it
became the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution.'0 "
While the first constitution of the State of New Jersey, adopted June 2,
1776, did not copy the English Bill of Rights' proscription against cruel and
unusual punishments as did other states,' 5 the principle that a punishment
should be proportionate to the crime is firmly grounded in New Jersey's

100. Granucci, supra note 97, at 853.
101. See Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The ProportionalityRule,
47 FORDHAM L. REV. 639 (1979).
In 1678, Titus Oates, a minister of the Church of England, proclaimed the existence
of a "Popish Plot," a Catholic plan to assassinate King Charles II. According to Oates,
following the assassination, a Catholic army would invade England in order to install
James (later named James II) as King. Oates was a liar and the "Popish Plot" a hoax.
Nevertheless, for political reasons, Oates was supported and 15 influential Catholics
were executed for treason. After James II became King, evidence of Oates' perjury

was adduced and he was convicted and sentenced to be fined, whipped, pillored,
defrocked and incarcerated for life. Oates appealed the sentence to both houses of
Parliament, arguing that his sentence was "inhumane and unparalleled." The House
of Lords rejected Oates' contention, but a minority dissented, using the term "cruel

and unusual" to describe Oates' sentence. The House of Commons agreed with the
dissenters in the House of Lords. Thus, Granucci argues persuasively that the real

meaning of the term "cruel and unusual punishment," as adopted by the American
framers of the Constitution, was based on their misinterpretation of the true intent
of the drafters of the English Bill of Rights: the eighth amendment therefore prohibits
excessive penalties as well as barbarous methods of punishment, where excessiveness
is measured in terms of disproportionality to the crime committed. Granucci, supra
note 97, at 856-60. See also Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Beccaria and the
Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Excessive
Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783 (1975).
102. Granucci, supra note 97, at 840.

103. Solem v. Helm, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3007 n.101 (1983).
104. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
105. N.J. CONST. art XXII (1776) provided:
Common and statute law of England, how far to be in force; trial by jury
confirmed.
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jurisprudence. This principle traces its origins to both common and statutory
law of England, beginning with the Magna Carta,' 6 and the First Statute of
Westminister.' 7 On September 2, 1844, a new constitution was adopted in
New Jersey which provided: "Excessive bail or fines; cruel and unusual
punishments. Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not
be imposed, and cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted."' 8 This
language was continued without change in the present New Jersey
Constitution. '09

That the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute
law, as have been heretofore practiced in this colony, should still remain in
force, until they shall be altered by a future law of the legislature; such parts
only excepted, as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this
chapter; and that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed,
as part of the law of this colony, without repeal, forever.
106. See Solem, 103 S. Ct at 3006 nn.8-9. Three chapters of the Magna Carta
were devoted to a rule against excessive "amercements," similar to modern day fines,
which were the most common sanction in 13th century England. Id. at 3006 n.8.
107. Id. at 3007 (citing 3 Edw. I, ch. 6 (1275)).
108. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 15 (1844). The commentary notes the following:
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, provides
that "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The Act of Congress of July 13,
1787, known as the Ordinance of 1787, declared in Article 2 that "All fines
shall be moderate, and no cruel or unusual punishments shall be inflicted."
The language in question was drafted by the Committee on Bill of Rights and
was incorporated into the 1844 Constitution without change. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NEW JERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1844 51-53 (1942).
109. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1947). During the 1947 constitutional convention
debates, it was merely noted that the language in question "was a time-tested principle
of merit." 3 RECORD, STATE OF N.J. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947 9 (1952).
The commentary to article I notes specifically:
While there is a good deal of similarity in the provisions of the statements
found in the various state constitutions, the particular expression of these
ideas found in the constitution of any given state is likely to be vigorously

defended by its citizens. It has strength which comes from long usage; the

clarity which comes from its having been judicially interpreted, and the veneration and respect which people give to institutions tried and proved.
Bills of rights have grown through the years . . . men have sought to
preserve the rights that they have already won, and to secure guarantees in
their fundamental law of those rights which, at the time, seem vital, but which
have not, heretofore, been so generally recognized or so commonly observed.

Graves, What Should a Constitution Contain?, in THE
PREPARATORY RESEARCH FOR THE NEW JERSEY

(Goldmann ed. 1947).

GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION
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In 1796, the state legislature ordered that capital punishment in New Jersey
be administered by hanging. ' 0 That form of execution prevailed until March
1, 1907, when the Electrocution Act"' went into effect, making death by the
electric chair the sole form of capital punishment in New Jersey. As the United
States Supreme Court had already held that the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishments was inapplicable to the individual
states," 2 the first challenge to electrocution as cruel and unusual punishment
to reach the New Jersey high court relied solely on state constitutional grounds.
In State v. Tomassi,"3 appellant challenged electrocution as a cruel and unusual
punishment in contravention of the New Jersey Constitution."
The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the dilemma it faced in
attempting to define what punishments may be "cruel and unusual" within
the state constitutional prohibition. It stated that "[i]n a limited sense, anything
is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imparts
pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all punishments are in
some sense cruel.'""I However, the court noted that the legislature had proclaimed that murder in the first degree should be a capital offense. When
the legislature replaced hanging with electrocution in an attempt to effect
executions as speedily" 6 as possible, the court concluded that it could not
assume that electrocution was unconstitutionally "cruel."' 7
Tomassi argued further that other aspects of the Electrocution Act mandating solitary confinement for the condemned following issuance of the
death warrant, and prohibiting visitors (save prison officers, counsel, physicians, clergy and members of the family) except by court order - were also
cruel under the state constitution. The court rejected this contention, noting
110. Bedau, Death Sentences in New Jersey, 1907-1960, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 1
& n.2 (1964).
111. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:165-1 (West 1971), repealed by N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:98-2 (West 1979).
112. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890). The Court denied relief under the following theory: "The decision of the state courts sustaining the validity of the act under
the state constitution is not re-examinable here, nor was that decision against any title,
right, privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed by the petitioner under the
Constitution of the United States." Id. at 447. The eighth amendment was subsequently
incorporated through the fourteenth amendment so as to apply to the states. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
113. 75 N.J.L. 739, 69 A. 214 (E. & A. 1908).
114. Id. at 746, 69 A. at 217.
115. Id. at 747, 69 A. at 218.
116. Presumably the word "speedily" was equated with "humanely" in the statute.
See id. ("the punishment of death must be inflicted 'by causing to pass through the
body of the convict a current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death as
speedily as possible' "). Subsequent electrocution developments belied that assumption.
See, e.g., The Execution Trend, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1983, at E14.
117. Tomassi, 75 N.J.L. at 747, 69 A. at 218.
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that since even more stringent provisions were contained in prior law, the court
8
could not rule that the new statute was unconstitutionally "cruel.""
Although the statute was upheld, this challenge foreshadowed the circular
development of the law regarding fundamental rights. The cycle began with
reliance on the various state constitutions, a shift to the federal Constitution
then occurred, and now the state courts have come full circle to recognize
once again their state constitutions as sources of individual rights." 9 For the
balance of this century, it can be expected that state constitutions in general,
and the New Jersey Constitution in particular, will play an important role in
guaranteeing fundamental rights, surpassing the federal Constitution in the
scope and breadth of protection afforded individual liberties.' 20 This analysis
will be seen frequently in the area of the death penalty as it is to be applied
in New Jersey.' 2'
B.

The New Jersey State Courts and Proportionality

There can be little question that the concept of proportionality is rooted
deeply in state law. As early as 1886, the New Jersey Supreme Court contrasted early "English criminal jurisprudence," where the accused often faced
a punishment disproportionateto his crime, with what it characterized as "[our]
more humane system of criminal law . ..which graduates the punishment
according to the magnitude of the offense." ' 22 This concept has been reaffirmed by the state supreme court in unequivocal terms on at least two separate
instances over the past fifteen years. In the first case, the defendant's driver's
license was suspended for one year following her conviction for marijuana
use.23 The supreme court provided the following framework for assessing
proportionality of punishments:
[A] court will pit the offense against the form of punishment.
If one is greatly disproportionate to the other, or if the punishment
goes beyond what appears to be a reasonable expedient to achieve
118. Id.

119. See, e.g., cases cited supra at note 17.
120. See, e.g., Pollock, supra note 17, at 707.
121. With each Supreme Court decision denying a challenge to a particular state's
death penalty statute, the universe of federal issues shrinks dramatically. See Greenhouse,
As Appeals Hit Final Stage, Life on Death Rows Runs Out, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18,
1983, at E5.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting from a denial of certiorari in Coleman v. Balkcom,
lamented that the exhaustive appeal process in death cases had made the existence
of the death penalty "virtually an illusion." 451 U.S. 949, 958 (1981). Three years
later, amidst the shrinking universe of federal relief, the death penalty is an illusion
no more.
122. Patterson v. State, 48 N.J.L. 381, 383, 4 A. 449, 450 (1886).
123. State v. Smith, 58 N.J. 202, 276 A.2d 369 (1971).
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the public purpose as it may be deduced from the legislation, then
the penalty will be condemned.' 2
The other case involved a conviction for kidnapping, assault and other crimes."
The court rephrased the test, emphasizing that the focus should be on whether
comparison shows the punishment and offense to be grossly disproportionate,
and whether the punishment exceeds that which is necessary to achieve a
"legitimate penal aim." 2 ' This traditional role of the proportionality inquiry
in the state criminal justice system cannot be questioned.
The concept of proportionality is further reflected in the general approach
to excessive sentences of both the New Jersey state courts and legislature. The
leading case of State v. Johnson'27 relied on an 1886 case to support its holding
that the courts may revise a sentence which is manifestly excessive, though
within authorized statutory limits.'28 This holding has been affirmed repeatedly
by the state supreme court,' 9 and has been codified in the New Jersey Court
Rules,' 30 with the caution that "it is only in the exceptional case that the trial
judge's use of discretion should be reversed. .
".'."
In fact, in recent years
only about five percent of all sentences appealed from have been so modified.' 3 2
More recently the legislature established, through a new penal code,' 3
a sentencing model "based on notions of proportionality and desert," 3 structured to prevent "excessive, disproportionateor arbitrary punishment.' 3 . In
State v. Roth, 3 6 the supreme court identified "appellate review of sentences
to provide a greater degree of uniformity" as a central issue in sentencing

124. Id. at 212, 276 A.2d at 374.
125. State v. Hampton, 61 N.J. 250, 294 A.2d 23 (1972).
126. Id. at 273-74, 294 A.2d at 36.
127. 67 N.J. Super. 414, 170 A.2d 830 (App. Div. 1961).
128. Id. at 432, 170 A.2d at 840. Johnson cited Patterson as authority to "root
out those anachronisms which would subvert our 'more humane system of criminal
law"' so as to avoid imposing on any prisoner a disproportionate punishment. Id.
at 429, 170 A.2d at 839.
129. See State v. Leggeadrine, 75 N.J. 150, 156-57, 380 A.2d 1112, 1116 (1977),
and cases cited therein.
130. N.J. CT. R. 2:10-3 (1984).
131. S.PRESSLER, CURRENT N.J. COURT RULES, Comment to R.2:10-3 (1985),
at 341.
132. State v. Whitaker, 79 N.J. 503, 513, 401 A.2d 509, 514 (1979) (30 of 628

such appeals were successful in the court year ending in August 1977, 41 of 652 in
the following year).
133. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-1 (West 1982).
134. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 355, 471 A.2d 370, 381 (1984) (quoting von Hirsch,

UtilitarianSentencing Resuscitated: The American Bar Association's Second Report
on Criminal Sentencing, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 772, 773 (1980)).
135. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-2(b)(4) (emphasis added).
136. 95 N.J. 334, 471 A.2d 370 (1984).
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reform.'3 7 In a companion case, State v. Hodge,'3' the court reaffirmed the
principle that statutes establishing penalties "must be construed 'so as to avoid
the unfairness of arbitrary enforcement.'
In short, the concepts of proportionality and fairness permeate the sentencing provisions of the new code and contemporaneous judicial interpretations. It would be a cruel irony if persons sentenced for non-capital offenses
are afforded review of the excessiveness of their sentences while individuals
sentenced to the "qualitatively" more serious penalty of death are denied a
comparable review. Under any sentencing statute, the appellate judiciary will
modify a death sentence if it is felt to be grossly disproportionate.'4I The formal requirement of proportionality review merely enables the courts to satisfy
this concern in a way that maintains the integrity of both the statute and the
entire criminal justice system.
Since the late 1950's, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that
the amount of discretion and responsibility vested in juries in death cases
reaches the same implied standard that guides trial judges in judicial sentencing:
after consideration of all the evidence,'" "the determination of that sentence
within statutory limits which best serves the interests of justice as between
society and the defendant."' 4 2 In State v. Mount,' 3 the state supreme court
again sanctioned explicitly the introduction of a full range of evidence as to
the defendant's background so as to best serve "the true interests of the State
in seeking a sound measure of justice as between society and the wrongdoer.'".
This approach to capital cases reflects a greater degree of caution and
special concern for procedures than that traditionally exercised by appellate
courts."' This policy, coupled with the general appellate power to revise
sentences evidencing a clear showing of abuse of discretion," led the state
supreme court in 1968 to rule that it had the power to substantively review
jury determinations of punishment either (1) to remedy procedural error in
"'39

137. Id. at 361, 471 A.2d at 385. Among the sentence review functions of the
appellate court is the determination whether "even though the court sentence is in
accordance with the [sentencing] guidelines, nevertheless the application of the guidelines
to the facts . . .makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial
conscience." Id. at 364-65, 471 A.2d at 387.
138. 95 N.J. 369, 471 A.2d 389 (1984).
139. Id. at 374, 471 A.2d at 392 (quoting, in part, State v. Maguire, 84 N.J.
508, 514 n.6, 423 A.2d 294, 297 n.6 (1980)).
140. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
141. State v. White, 27 N.J. 158, 178-80, 142 A.2d 65, 76-77 (1958).
142. State v. Johnson, 34 N.J. 212, 230, 168 A.2d 1, 10, cert. denied, 368 U.S.
933 (1961).
143. 30 N.J. 195, 152 A.2d 343 (1959).
144. Id. at 219, 152 A.2d at 355.
145. State v.Wolf, 46 N.J. 301, 309, 216 A.2d 586, 590 (1966).
146. State v. Tyson, 43 N.J. 411, 417, 204 A.2d 864, 867 (1964).
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the course of the trial, or (2) to reduce death verdicts unwarranted by the
evidence. ",
In State v. Laws,' the supreme court reviewed the case law and held
it was "firmly convinced of the sufficiency of our appellate power to modify
a discretionary sentence whenever the interests of justice so require."" 9 The
defendants in Laws had been convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced
to death. On appeal, the supreme court found that their guilt had been firmly
established at trial but that error had been committed in the imposition of
the death penalty. Instead of ordering a "burdensome" and "costly" retrial,
the court ruled that it had the power to modify the defendants' discretionary
sentences in the interest of justice, particularly since the prosecutor had agreed
to waive the death penalty.' The court emphasized that the "delegates who
drafted the 1947 Constitution deliberately vested this Court with sweeping
judicial power to the end that it would be fully equipped to see that justice
is soundly administered."'' The Laws decision stands for the proposition that
rigorous appellate review of death sentences is essential to avoid arbitrary and
inconsistent application of the death penalty." '
In a review of the Laws case, one commentator wrote:
[The decision] suggests a sympathy for the appellate practice of
"finding" procedural error where the real ground for reversal is the
court's belief that the sentence is too severe. One possible implication
of this attitude is that, although the court is empowered to lower a
death sentence on the ground of manifest excessiveness, it may instead
reduce the sentence by stretching the law or magnifying errors it would
ordinarily deem harmless. Overt sentence review has at least two
advantages over this technique. It avoids making bad law, and, by
achieving justice in a more direct manner, it permits both counsel and
court to focus upon the real issue - whether the death penalty is
unwarranted by the evidence.' 53
147. State v. Laws, 51 N.J. 494, 242 A.2d 333 (1968).
148. 51 N.J. 494, 242 A.2d 333 (1968).
149. Id. at 509-10, 242 A.2d at 342 (emphasis added). The decision also noted

the then-current ABA standards suggesting that "since sentencing in each case by a
different jury contributes significantly to unfounded disparity between sentences, there
is 'all the more reason for judicial review in those cases where the jury participates
in sentencing.' " Id. at 510, 242 A.2d at 342 (quoting, in part, ABA PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE

REVIEW OF SENTENCES 17 (1968)). Although the Laws court construed the issue before
it more narrowly, nothing in the court's opinion suggests a rejection of the ABA
approach.
150. Id.at 515, 242 A.2d at 344-45.
151. Id.at 515, 242 A.2d at 344.
152. Note, State v. Laws: Appellate Power to Reduce Jury-DeterminedDeath
Sentences, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 490, 528 (1969).
153. Id.at 529.
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The Laws holding was reaffirmed in a flurry of supreme court cases,
similarly modifying other death sentences. 4 There has been no indication that
this line of reasoning would be rejected by the current supreme court in the
wake of the Pulley decision. Articulation of a proportionality requirement
indeed allows the courts to avoid making bad law by focusing judicial review
on the real injustice presented in death cases where sentences are arguably
excessive. By acknowledging the real injustice of disproportionate or excessive
sentencing instead of exaggerating procedural flaws or substantive errors, capital
criminal procedures are more easily identified and reach just results more
directly."'
The authority of the state courts to apply proportionality review to
sentences extends beyond that arising from the cruel and unusual punishments
clause of the state constitution' 6 or from the general appellate power to examine
criminal sentences to determine if they are manifestly excessive.' The state
constitution, through article VI, provides an additional independent source
of power by providing that the supreme court "would be in a fair position
to insure that justice is truly and equally done."' 58 Article VI vests the New
Jersey Supreme Court "with wide judicial power, perhaps more sweeping than
that granted to any other court of last resort."' 9 The new judicial article of
the 1947 constitution "purposefully modernized and greatly strengthened our
judicial system."' 60 Under article VI, the state supreme court "shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction in the last resort in all causes provided in this
Constitution."' 6 ' It is also specified that appeals may be taken to the supreme
court "in capital causes."'6 2 The supreme court is also empowered, as is the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court, to "exercise such original jurisdiction as may be necessary to the complete determination of any cause on
review."' 6
This broad-based appellate review has been characterized as "a remedial
procedure secured against legislative interference,'"" and as one which was
drafted "to provide a review of matters of fact as well as of law, in accordance
154. See, e.g., State v. Holland, 59 N.J. 451, 463, 283 A.2d 897, 903 (1971);
State v. Conyers, 58 N.J. 123, 147, 275 A.2d 721, 733 (1971); State v. Royster, 57
N.J. 472, 491, 273 A.2d 574, 584 (1971).
155. Note, supra note 152, at 528-29.
156. See generally supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
157. See generally supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
158. Laws, 51 N.J. at 500, 242 A.2d at 337.
159. Id.

160. Id.
161. N.J. CONST. art. VI, §2, para. 2 (1947).
162. N.J. CONST. art. VI, §5, para. l(c) (1947). See also N.J. CT. R. 2:2-1(a)(3)
(specifying that such appeal is "as of right" in a case "where the death penalty has
been imposed").
163. N.J. CONST. art VI, §5, para. 3 (1947).
164. Hager v. Weber, 7 N.J. 201, 205, 81 A.2d 155, 157 (1951).
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with the historic function of an 'appeal.' "165 Indeed, the 1947 constitution
was deliberately drafted to provide "[the supreme court] with sweeping judicial
power to the end that it would be fully equipped to see that justice is soundly
66
administered."'
An examination of the debate on the Judiciary Article reveals that there
was never any question in the minds of the 1947 constitutional convention
delegates that the supreme court would have the power to review fully all aspects
of all capital cases. Of special interest are the comments of then-Governor
Alfred E. Driscoll. Governor Driscoll supported a planwhereby "only cases
of major importance .. .such [as those involving] .. .the death penalty
• . .need be taken up to the top court."'' 6 9 To insure equality and uniformity
in treatment of criminal defendants, the Governor also endorsed an integrated
court system in language directly on point in any proportionality inquiry:
Ever since the days of Aristotle mankind has thought in terms
of equality before the law. Equality is not achieved in a system that
is as disjointed as is our system. Let me give you three cases involving
these men who were found guilty of murder in the second degree.
These men had reasonably comparable minor criminal records prior
to their conviction for second degree murder. The sentences imposed
in these three cases were as follows: Mr. "A" received a sentence
of from six to eight years; Mr. "B" received a sentence of from 15
to 20 years; Mr. "C" received a sentence of from 25 to 30 years.
Now members of the Committee, may I make it perfectly clear
that I recognize that circumstances alter cases and that trial judges
confronted with one of the most serious assignments that can be given
to any man or woman, namely, that of sending a convicted criminal
to jail, must be given considerable latitude in determining the
appropriate sentence. Nonetheless, in an integrated court system, with
proper administrative authority vested in a Chief Justice, we can come
closer to achieving the degree of uniformity that is so highly desirable
in a republic than is evidenced in the cases that I have just cited.' 7 °
165. Id. at 211, 81 A.2d at 160. On this point, the Hager court cited Vaill v.

McPhail, a case suggesting that the scope of appeal will depend upon "the nature
of the questions carried to the appellate court, the extent of the jurisdiction of the
appellate court over the cause, and as to the procedure in that court." 34 R.I. 361,
366, 83 A. 1075, 1077 (1912).
166. Laws, 51 N.J. at 514, 242 A.2d at 344.
167. See, e.g., Report of the Comm'n on Revision of the New Jersey Constitu-

tion

(1942), reprinted in 4 RECORD, STATE OF NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-

1947 556, 559 (1952); id. at 266-67 (statement of William H. Wurts); id. at
178 (colloquy between Judge Daniel Brennan and Judiciary Comm. member Thomas
J.Brogan).
168. Id. at 427-45.
169. Id. at 432.
170. Id. at 434-35.
TION OF
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In construing this power, the supreme court has focused on the unrestricted
provision of appeal as of right in capital cases,'"' noting specifically that:
Nowhere in . . . [the history of capital cases in New Jersey] is
there any suggestion of either legislative authority or purpose to curb
appellate powers; indeed all of it may be searched in vain for any
indication whatever that, in fixing and altering the penalty for murder,
the legislators ever gave any thought to or ever entertained any restric72
tive views with respect to the court's authority on appeal.1
Vigorous exercise of this judicial authority further reduces the legislature's
authority and its effect on defendants' appeals in criminal cases.'" 3
Given this sweeping and unfettered grant of review power, any suggestion
that an exception exists for proportionality review would be anomalous. The
power to reduce death sentences which are disproportionate to other death
sentences is precisely the power "to insure that justice is truly and equally
, 74
done." '
IV.

PROPORTIONALITY AND FUNDAMENTAL

FAIRNESS IN NEW JERSEY

Beyond the state constitutional mandates discussed above, other compelling public policy rationales exist for retaining proportionality review in New
Jersey. First, proportionality review is necessary to insure the avoidance of
arbitrariness "inherent in the processing of any murder case."' 7 Also, proportionality review imposes no significant burden on the judiciary. Further,
the limited empirical evidence currently available indicates that proportionality
will be an issue in the first wave of state death penalty reviews., 76 Finally,
its presence enables the judiciary to provide for fundamental fairness in death
penalty reviews in a way that best maintains the integrity of the state statutory
scheme and the entire criminal justice system.
171. Laws, 51 N.J. at 501, 242 A.2d at 337.
172. Id. at 502, 242 A.2d at 338. Cf. King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J.
161, 330 A.2d 1 (1974) (citation omitted):
The power of the Court to enforce rights recognized by the New Jersey
Constitution, even in the complete absence of implementing legislation, is
clear ....
Just as the Legislature cannot abridge constitutional rights by its
enactments, it cannot curtail them through its silence, and the judicial obligation to protect the fundamental rights of individuals is as old as this country.
Id. at 177, 330 A.2d at 9-10 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163
(1803)). See also Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 77 389 A.2d
465, 476 (1978).
173. Laws, 51 N.J. at 500-01, 242 A.2d at 337.
174. Id. at 500, 242 A.2d at 337.
175. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
176. See, e.g., McCrary v. State, 97 N.J. 132, 478 A.2d 339 (1984).
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Identifying Arbitrariness

The Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia'7 7 identified three discretionary
stages inherent in the processing of murder cases under post-Furman"8 death
penalty statutes: prosecutorial discretion, jury discretion and discretionary
gubernatorial commutation.' 79 In theory, proportionality review at the appellate
level, if conducted properly, will expose disproportionality in the areas of
prosecutorial discretion in seeking death penalty and jury discretion in imposing the death sentence in the penalty phase after guilt has been determined.
Discretionary gubernatorial decisions as to commutation of death sentences
would be unaffected by any proportionality review.' 80 Commutation thus
paradoxically remains at once the greatest threat to the even-handed application of death penalty as well as the last bastion of mercy.' 8 '
1.

Prosecutorial Discretion

While it is clear that a mandatory death penalty for murder is
unconstitutional,' 82 it is also clear that unfettered discretion in the imposition
of the death penalty is constitutionally impermissible.'3 Thus, in an effort
to constitutionally "tailor"' 84 the discretion inherent in the prosecutorial function, the New Jersey statute contains the following aggravating factors by which
homicide cases are to be measured - those few' 85 which may be appropriate
for capital prosecutions are to be culled from the vast majority of non-capital
prosecutions:
(a)

The defendant has previously been convicted of murder;

177. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
178. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
179. See generally Sheloff, The Arbitrarinessof the ArbitraryRule in Death Penalty
Cases in the United States, 11 ISRAEL Y.B.

oN

HUM. Rrs. 217 (1981).

180. Commutation has been provided for in the state constitution since 1776. See
N.J. CONST. art. V, § 2, para. 1 (1947). Between 1907 and 1960 there were 232 death
sentences handed down in New Jersey of which 157 resulted in execution and 34 in
commutation. See Bedau, supra note 110, at 6-7.
181. As Justices Brennan and Marshall highlighted in their dissent in Pulley, 104
S. Ct. at 888-90 & n.5, if ever there were a death case which epitomized the disproportionate application of the ultimate penalty, it was the case of John Spenkelink.
Spinkellink v. State, 313 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911 (1976),
and Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
976 (1979). Commutation would have been particularly appropriate in this case. See
Sherrill, supra note 6, at 82-83.
182. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 337 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
183. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 245 (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971)).
184. Id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
185. The New Jersey system was intended to produce death sentences in less than
one percent of all murder cases tried. N.Y. Times, May 7, 1983, at B3.
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(b) In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely
or knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim;
(c) The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an
aggravated battery to the victim;
(d) The defendant committed the murder as consideration for
the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary
value;
(e) The defendant procured the commission of the offense by
payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value;
(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another
offense committed by the defendant or another;
(g) The offense was committed while the defendant was engaged
in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson,
burglary or kidnapping;
(h) The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in
2C:27-1, while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official
duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant.' 86
In view of the number of factors and the generality of the language used to
prescribe them, it is nearly impossible to imagine a homicide that could not
be made to fall within the ambit of at least one of the statutory aggravating
factors.' 87 Prosecutorial discretion to choose who will face death penalty
186. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4) (West 1982),
187. Moreover, the individual factors themselves are so broadly defined as to provide virtually no guidance as to which defendant comes within their scope and which
does not. Even a very cursory comparison of the New Jersey statute with equivalent
provisions in the Georgia statute reveals the poor drafting of New Jersey's aggravating

factors. For example, N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2C: 11-3(c)(4)(b) provides: "In the commis-

sion of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of death
to another person in addition to the victim." By contrast, the equivalent Georgia provision reads: "The offender by his act of murder ... knowingly created a great risk
of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device
which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person." GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(3) (1981).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(h) states: "[Tlhe defendant murdered a public servant as defined in 2C:27-1 while the victim was engaged in the performance of his
official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:27-1(g) (West 1982) defines a "public servant" as: "any officer or employee of
government, including legislators and judges, and any person participating as juror,
adviser, consultant or otherwise, in performing a governmental function, but the term
does not include witnesses" (emphasis added). Under this broad formulation, anyone
who works for a government agency such as street-cleaners, road maintenance workers,
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prosecution and who will not is, therefore, at least potentially, unfettered., 88
Prosecutorial charging in capital cases when there is no meaningful basis
for distinguishing the accused from others charged with similar offenses violates
due process, and discriminates invidiously against the accused in several ways.
First, in such prosecutions jurors are subjected to a death qualification
process' which excludes from jury service those who believe either that they

typists, file clerks, etc., would come within the ambit of the New Jersey aggravating
factors. By contrast, the equivalent Georgia aggravating factors, GA. CODE ANN.
§27-2534. 1(b)(5) and (8), specifically limit "public servants" to judicial officers, district
attorneys,- district solicitors, peace and correction officers, and firemen.
Aggravating factor (d) in the New Jersey statute states: "The defendant committed
the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt of
any thing of pecuniary value" (emphasis added). The Georgia provision, GA.CODE
ANN. § 27-2534.1(b)(4), reads: "The offender committed the offense of murder for
himself or another for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary
value (emphasis added).
The contrast between the relative specificity of the Georgia statute and the vaguely
drafted New Jersey provisions is evident. The broad scope of the factors in the New
Jersey statute, coupled with the number of aggravating factors, demonstrate that
although in form the New Jersey statute purports to penalize only "aggravated" murders,
in substance, it encompasses any homicide, and provides "no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] .. .is imposed from the

many cases in which it is not." Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring). But
see State v. Bass, 189 N.J. Super. 445, 460 A.2d 214 (Law Div. 1983). For a comprehensive and exhaustive study which concludes that the New Jersey death penalty
statute is unconstitutional, see Comment, Constitutional Infirmities of the Capital
Punishment Act, 13 SETON HALL L. REv. 515 (1983).

188. There is more than a semantic difference between "discretion" and what
prosecutors prefer to call "professional judgment." However, there can be no argument that if, indeed, the New Jersey death penalty statute is applied unevenly from
county to county, it is arbitrary and, therefore, unconstitutional. See Schwaneberg,
ProsecutorsStrive for Consistency in Cases Involving the Death Penalty, Newark StarLedger, Aug. 7, 1983, § 1, at 41, col. 1. See generally Special Project, supra note
83, at 342-47.
On the question of racial discrimination and prosecutorial discretion, see Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty
in South Carolina,74 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 784 (1983) (prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty in South Carolina" is significantly related to the race
of the victim"); see also Radelet & Vandiver, supra note 33 (greatest impact of racial
variables in Florida death penalty cases may be at prosecutorial and sentencing phases).
189. Death qualification in New Jersey is authorized by N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:11-3c(1) (West 1982). See State v. Bass, 189 N.J. Super. 461, 460 A.2d 223 (Law
Div. 1983) (upheld federal constitutionality of death qualified jury in guilt determination phase); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (constitutional for
death qualified jury to determine guilt and sentence of defendant). Cf. Grigsby v. Mabry,
569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (unconstitutionality of death qualified jury at
sentencing and at guilty determination phase), stay granted, 583 F. Supp. 629 (E.D.
Ark. 1983); People v. Pacheco, 116 Cal. App. 3d 617, 172 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1981) (death
qualified jury allowed at guilt determination phase by federal and state constitution
only in cases which are certain to reach the sentencing phase).
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would automatically vote against the death penalty or that they might not
vote impartially on the issue of guilt.' 9 This procedure, which eliminates certain jurors because of their political, religious or moral opposition to the death
penalty, affects significantly the pool from which jurors are selected for trial.'91
Studies indicate that death-qualified juries are significantly more likely to return
guilty verdicts than non-death qualified juries.' 92 Also, death qualified juries
are significantly more likely to reject the insanity defense in cases of nonorganic mental disorders.' 93 This process of "death qualification," and the
190. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on an Eleventh Circuit habeas corpus case which held that, under Witherspoon, a juror was improperly
excused where she did not "unequivocally" state that she would automatically be unable
to impose death sentence. Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 2168 (1984), oral argument heard, 53 U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Oct.
9, 1984).
191. Through the sixth amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), a criminal defendant is entitled to a "jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community." Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1978). In Ballew v. Georgia, the Court recognized
the critical importance of the cross-section requirement, stressing that meaningful community participation cannot be attained with the exclusion of minorities or other identifiable groups from jury service. 435 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1978). The sixth amendment
forbids "systematic exclusion of identifiable segments of the community from jury
panels and from the juries ultimately drawn from those panels," because all groups
have "the right to participate in the overall legal processes by which criminal guilt
and innocence are determined." Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 413 (1972).
192. Courts have been presented with studies documenting this common sense
notion in the context of death penalty cases with differing interpretations of their import.
See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Hovey v. Superior Court,
28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1980). For a discussion of the death
qualification process in the context of New Jersey law, see generally Special Project,
supra note 83, at 370-75. See also Boehm, Mr. Prejudice, Miss Sympathy, and the
AuthoritarianPersonality:An Application of Psychological Measuring Techniques to

the Problem of Jury Bias, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 734 (juror's political ideology has systemic

effect on behavior as juror); Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital
Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of PsychologicalData to Raise Presumptions in the Law,

5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53 (1970) (tendency for pro-death penalty jurors to assert
guilt of defendant); Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified Jury" on
the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARv. L. REV. 567 (1971) (death-qualified jury
is a conviction-prone jury); Rokeach & McLellan, Dogmatism and the Death Penalty:
A Reinterpretation of the Duquesne Poll Data, 8 DUQUESNE L. REV. 125 (1969-70)
(referring to data reported at Comment, 7 DUQUESNE L. REV. 414 (1969)); WHITE,

The ConstitutionalInvalidity of Convictions Imposed by Death Qualified Juries, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 1176 (1973) (reporting the 1971 Harris study). The more recent studies,
particularly those by Dr. Phoebe Ellsworth and her associates, are discussed in Cowan,

Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effect of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition
to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUMAN BEIAV. 53 (1984).
193. Ellsworth, Butaky, Cowan & Thompson, The Death Qualified Jury and the
Defense of Insanity, 8 LAW & HUMAN BErtAV. 81 (1984). See generally Jacoby & Pater-

noster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury Packing:FurtherChallenges to the Death Penalty,
73 J. CRnI. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379 (1982) (arguing that cases such as Witherspoon,
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subtle pro-prosecution bias on the part of juries which have been deathqualified, deprive the capital defendant of his or her right to a fair and impartial jury.'9 Therefore, the decision to charge a criminal defendant with a capital
crime in order to seek the death penalty has immense impact on the jury which
will serve in any given case.
While it would appear that the appropriate time to resolve the problem
of prosecutorial discretion as a potential source of proportionality-offending
arbitrariness is pre-trial, this is not the current state of the law in New Jersey.' 95
In State v. Bass,'96 Renee Nicely, an Essex County mother, was indicted with
a co-defendant for her son's death stemming from on-going child abuse. The
State sought the death penalty, relying on the sole aggravating factor that
the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that
it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the
victim.''' 97
The defense investigation revealed that since the enactment of the New
Jersey death penalty on August 5, 1983, there were at least nineteen other
child abuse-related deaths reported to the Office of the Child Abuse Control
of the Division of Youth and Family Services. Neither the Essex County
Prosecutor's Office nor any other prosecutor's office in New Jersey sought
the death penalty against any person other than defendant Nicely in a child
abuse-related death. ' Defense counsel then served subpoenas on various New
Jersey agencies, seeking documents relevant to all child deaths involving abuse,
abandonment, cruelty or neglect after the death penalty became effective, 99
in order to support the contention that the numerous similar or more egregious
cases of homicide stemming from child abuse throughout the State were not
being treated as death penalty cases. '
rather than eliminating racial bias, have simply cast discrimination and bias into more
"sophisticated forms"; procedures may produce racially unrepresentative juries and
jurors biased towards conviction and death - precisely what Witherspoon was
"designed" to eliminate).
194. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (due process requires fair and impartial jury to try issues of fact); Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983)
(death qualified jury for determining defendants' guilt or innocence violates defendants' right to fair trial and due process).
195. See infra text accompanying notes 197-202. A pre-penalty proportionality
review, however, was approved in Smith v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 411, 413-14
(Ky. 1982). A recent New Jersey decision provides that a defendant may challenge,
prior to trial, the sufficiency of evidence supporting the prosecution's alleged aggravating
factors. See State v. McCrary, 97 N.J. 132, 478 A.2d 339 (1984). For a discussion
of this case and prosecutorial discretion in New Jersey, see generally Special Project,
supra note 83, at 342-47.
196. 191 N.J. Super. 347, 466 A.2d 978 (Law Div. 1983).
197. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3c(4)(c) (West 1982).
198. Information on file with the Office of the Public Defender, Trenton, New
Jersey, 08625.
199. 191 N.J. Super. at 349, 466 A.2d at 979.
200. In support of this contention, the defense learned that the capriciousness
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The subpoenaed parties moved to quash the subpoenas, and the trial court
granted the motion. Significantly, the trial court found that the subpoenas
'
and denied defendant relief.
did not "need" to be honored at that time201
This was not because the claim of disproportionality could never be supported
by the subpoenaed documents but because, pursuant to the New Jersey death
penalty statute, disproportionality is to be "considered only after the death
penalty is imposed." 2"2 Thus, while the state supreme court has yet to review
its first appeal from a death penalty case, the emerging jurisprudence of death
penalty litigation in New Jersey contemplates a proportionality review of the
prosecutorial decision to seek the death penalty. Such review may result in
the reversal of a conviction if the prosecutorial judgment to seek the death
penalty was found to be the result of unfettered discretion.
True proportionality review necessarily requires a review of all homicide cases statewide, regardless of whether the death penalty was sought,
to analyze the application of the death penalty statewide as well 2as
04
country-wide." 3 In addition, individual defendants must be compared
to insure that elements of sexual,2"' racial 0 6 and socio-economic discriminawith which the death penalty was sought by the State extended to cases within the
Essex County Prosecutor's Office itself. The prosecutor did not seek the death penalty
where another defendant was charged with child abuse and purposeful and knowing
murder of her nine month old daughter. The child died as a result of burns on the
body surface and fractures of the skull with subdural hemorrhage inflicted at least
24 hours before the burns. In addition, the child had numerous older injuries, including
cigarette burns on the buttocks at least three weeks old.
201. 191 N.J. Super. at 352, 466 A.2d at 981.
202. Id. at 350, 466 A.2d at 980. The court found it unnecessary to define proportionality review other than to note that such review is effected by "comparing factors relating to the particular case and the defendant before the court with the evidence
and sentence in similar cases." Id. Interestingly, the defendant was convicted of murder
but was not sentenced to the ultimate penalty by the jury.
203. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 112 Before the N.J. Senate Judiciary Comm., 200th
Leg., 2nd Sess. 20-21 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hearings] (statement of the
Director of Division of Criminal Justice Edwin H. Stier, speaking on behalf of New
Jersey Attorney General Irwin I. Kimmelman: proportionality review should be applied
on a state-wide basis "to guard against an imbalance, a disproportionate imposition
of the death penalty in any one area").
204. Bass, 191 N.J. Super. at 350, 466 A.2d at 980.
205. See Bedau, supra note 110, at 11. From 1907 to 1960, three women were
sentenced to death and all had their sentences commuted. The last woman to be executed
in New Jersey was Bridget Dergan, who was hanged on August 30, 1867. Id. Twentysix women received life sentences for murder between 1907 and 1956. Id. at 12. Of
3,812 executions in 42 states and the District of Columbia between 1930-1962, only
30 or 0.8qo, were women. Id. See Radelet, Racial Characteristicsand the Imposition
of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 918, 922 (1981) (the death penalty is almost
never imposed in primary relationships where the accused and the victim knew each
other).
206. The most compelling evidence that the death penalty continues to be
administered unconstitutionally relates to the racial discrimination that
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tion" 7 do not invidiously infect the prosecutorial charging decision. Upon a
showing of unfettered prosecutorial discretion, the New Jersey Supreme Court
should not hesitate to vacate a death penalty as a result of its proportionality
review.
2.

Jury Discretion

A major federal constitutional defect of the death penalty statutes
invalidated by the United States Supreme Court in 1972208 was their failure
to guide juries in the exercise of their discretion. This failure created an
unconstitutional opportunity for discrimination.209 Indeed, Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion in Furman thoroughly documented the pattern of racially
discriminatory sentencing in capital cases.2"0 Discrimination was not restricted
to the South; rather, several scholarly works have documented patterns of
discrimination in applying the former New Jersey death penalty statute. 2 '
After the Supreme Court's decisions in Gregg v. Georgia"2 and Proffitt
v. Florida,"3 it was expected that racial discrimination would not infect the
application of the new death penalty statutes because of their supposed objecapparently, and perhaps invariably, exists in its application. .

.

. Further-

more, the scholarly research necessary to support a claim of systematic racial
discrimination is currently being pursued and the results of that research are
being compiled into a rapidly expanding body of literature.
Pulley, 104 S. Ct. at 887 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
207. " 'The defendant of wealth and position never goes to the electric chair or
the gallows' . . . [I]t is more likely to be applied to the ignorant, the poor and the

friendless." Bedau, supra note at 110, at 27. Testifying at the 1972 death penalty legislation hearings, Stephen Nagler, then-executive director of the New Jersey chapter of
the American Civil Liberties Union, quoted Michael V. DiSalle, former Governor of
Ohio:
The men in death row in the Ohio State Penitentiary today, as during my
administration, have one thing in common, they are penniless. I have never
seen a person of means go to the chair. It is the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the member of the minority group who become society's blood
sacrifice.

Hearings on S. 799 and A. 556, A. 1318 Before the N.J. Assembly Judiciary Comm.
10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings].
208. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
209. Id. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 249-52 (Douglas J., concurring).
211. See Wolf, Abstract of Analysis of Jury Sentencing in Capital Cases: New
Jersey 1937-61, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 56, 60 (1964) (black person convicted of murder

had 47.507o chance
Bedau, supra note
receiving clemency
212. 428 U.S.
213. 428 U.S.

of receiving death penalty; white defendant had 30.4076 chance);
110, at 19 (non-white defendant has only one-half the chance of
as white person).
153 (1976).
242 (1976).
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tive eligibility criteria and the safeguard of meaningful appellate review. In
one case, a federal court of appeals refused even to consider the merits of
an argument that the death penalty continued to be imposed in "an arbitrary,
capricious, and irrational manner," finding that, in a properly-drawn statute,
the "arbitrariness and capriciousness condemned in Furman have been conclusively removed.""
While current evidence of discriminatory application of the death penalty
is not wholly conclusive," 5 a number of studies have concluded that the death
penalty continues to be applied in the same racially discriminatory manner
as in the past.216 For example, there is evidence that blacks are more likely
than other racial groups to be indicted for and convicted of capital murder,
more likely to receive the death sentence and, once sentenced to death, less
likely to have the sentence commuted.2 " 7
The focus on jury discretion is also significant for other reasons: (1) no
individual juror or jury can have a full grasp of the "big picture" of sentencing, nor will the jury necessarily reflect dominant community sentiment; 18

214. Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 976 (1979). But see Pulley, 104 S. Ct. at 889 & n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
and supra note 181.
215. Pulley, 104 S. Ct. at 887 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. See Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrarinessand DiscriminationUnder Post-Furman
Capital Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 563, 629 (1980); Jacoby & Paternoster,
supra note 193, at 380; Reidel, Discriminationin the Imposition of the Death Penalty:
A Comparison of the Characteristicsof Offenders Sentenced Pre-Furmanand PostFurman, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 261, 282-83 (1976); Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration
of the Death Penalty: the Florida Experience, 95 HARv. L. REV. 456, 459 (1981). See
also Joyner, Legal Theories ForAttacking Racial Disparity in Sentencing, 18 CRIM.
L. BULL. 101 (1982):
Glaring disparities in the sentencing of poor and minority defendants, as compared to those convicted of crimes who are affluent and white, lack a principled basis,... undermines the integrity of the entire criminal justice process,
implicates the court in racial and economic discrimination and are a major
cause of prision unrest and community disrespect for the legal process.
Id. at 101-02 (quoting NATIONAL MINORITY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL

JUSTICE,
THE INEQUALITY OF JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
IN THE MINORITY COMMUNITY 219-24 (1980)).

217. See Jordan, Study Reveals Victim's Race Affects Penalty Verdict, 113 N.J.L.J.
319 (1984). See, e.g., Lempert, Capital Punishment in the 80's: Reflections on the
Symposium, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1101 (1983) ("Greater retribution is
demanded when whites are victims than when blacks are victims because the white
dominated society values innocent white lives more than innocent black ones. ...
To execute one whose victim is white when he would have been spared had his victim
been black is intolerable in a system that demands equality and fairness, however
understandable or even admirable the process that led to the distinction."). Id. at 1107,
1114.
218. Goodpaster, supra note 7, at 798.
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(2) there is some evidence that jurors, aware of the significant number of reversals in the capital sentencing process, 19' "may suppress doubts about imposing the death penalty because they think someone else will rescind the order
to execute," '2 0 and (3) under the sort of statute sanctioned in Pulley - requiring
jurors to perform a subtle balancing test between aggravating and mitigating
factors"' - there is still ample room for arbitrariness to invade the decisionmaking process. Proportionality review can also detect those instances in which
the imposition of the death penalty results from an improper weighing of these
competing factors. In short, in the area of jury discretion, proportionality
provides an independent form of review that other forms of review cannot
duplicate. Such review is essential for detecting errors.222
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent in Pulley,223 our courts can
no longer ignore these discriminatory sentencing patterns. Indeed, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals has recently ordered an evidentiary hearing on the
question of racial discrimination in sentencing patterns,22 and the Supreme
Court has stayed at least one execution225 until this question is resolved.
Proportionality review by the New Jersey Supreme Court will be the key
factor in the identification and elimination of racially discriminatory results
in the application of the New Jersey death penalty statute. New Jersey has
a proud record of being in the vanguard of assuring that no citizen is treated
unfairly because of race or ethnic background. Since 1947, the state constitution has provided that "[no person shall be denied the enjoyment of any
civil . . . right, nor be discriminated against . . . because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin." 2 ' The application of these
principles can be no less stringent when a life is at stake.
The scope of the proportionality review conducted by the New Jersey
Supreme Court must necessarily be broad-based, unrestricted, and bold in
scope. This is so, not only because death is qualitatively different from other
219. See Marshall, Remarks Delivered at Dedication Ceremony for 1983 Volume
of the Annual Survey of American Law (April 9, 1984), at 5 (defendants prevailed
in 46% of all federal courts of appeals challenges to district court denials of habeas
corpus relief in death penalty cases last year).
220, Greenberg, CapitalPunishment as a System, 91 YALE L. REV. 908, 927 (1982).
221. Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4), (5).
222. Goodpaster, supra note 7, at 813.
223. 104 S. Ct. at 887 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
224. Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, 1582-83 (lth Cir. 1983).
225. Stephens v. Kemp, 104 S. Ct. 562 (1983). Interestingly, it has been reported
that the State of Georgia has been unable to locate an expert who could testify that
the arbitrary results produced by the statute are not the result of racial discrimination.
Bruck, Decisions of Death: The Lottery of Capital Punishment is Rigged by Race,
New Republic, Dec. 12, 1983, at 18, 21.
226. N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 5 (1947). This section was considered carefully and
debated at great length at the 1947 Constitutional convention. For a full listing of
all commentary, see 5 RECORD,
OF 1947 1014-15 (1952).

STATE OF

NEw

JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
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punishments227 and is "unique in its severity and irrevocability" 22 ' but because
death penalty statutes in general, and New Jersey's in particular, mandate
an individualized sentencing procedure,229 emphasizing discretion. 3
Indeed, to be constitutionally valid, a modern death penalty statute, following the rulings of Lockett v. Ohio"' and Green v. Georgia,232 must not stop
the sentencer from "considering any aspect of the defendant's character and
record or any circumstancesof his offense as an independently mitigating factor" to be weighed against the imposition of death.23 ' For example, the Georgia
statute contains a provision wherein "the jury is not required to find any
mitigating circumstance in order to make a recommendation of mercy that
is binding on the trial court.""23 The New Jersey statute contains no such
provision and may well thus be unconstitutional.233 However, the New Jersey
statute does authorize, within the context of its statutory mitigating factors,
consideration of any factor in mitigation so long as it is somehow relevant
to the defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the crime.2 36 To
fulfill the proportionality mandate, this section must be given the expansive
reading required by Lockett.
B.

Other Factors

Proportionality review is also essential to insure the implementation of
a death penalty statute that meets minimal criteria of fairness and justice.
Even absent the factors of discrimination and bias, the fact that fallible human
beings - members of juries and trial judges - are entrusted with life and
death decisions necessitates inquiry as to whether a sentence is excessive or
disproportionate as compared with the punishment meted out to others for
similar crimes. Atlantic County Prosecutor Joseph Fusco has candidly iden-

227. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
228. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187.
229. Furman not only invalidated the two death penalty statutes in the cases before
the court, but also indicated that the death penalty can only be constitutionally valid
if the procedure by which the ultimate sentence is imposed is a guided, individualized
one where the "makeup and situation of each offender" is carefully weighed. Subsequent decisions reaffirmed the basic premise that criminal defendants may be sentenced
to death only if the sentencing decision was guided and individualized. See, e.g., Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601-04 (1978). See Dix, supra note 39.
230. Dix, supra note 39.
231. 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
232. 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978).

233. Id. at 607 (emphasis added). See Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the
Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the Capital Defendant's Right to Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALYF. L. REv. 317 (1981).
234. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-99.
235. Cf. State v. Bass, 189 N.J. Super. 445, 455, 460 A.2d 214, 220 (Law. Div.
1983).
236. N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:11-3(c)(5)(h).
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tified this dilemma: "We are trying to be uniform, ...
but we are human
'
beings talking about complex fact patterns." 237
A proportionality review mechanism will not burden the judiciary in assessing death sentences. As indicated above, the state constitution explicitly allows
an automatic appeal to the state supreme court in all capital cases,238 a
requirement incorporated in the death penalty statute by the legislature. 39 If
the statute is being administered properly so that the death sentence is only
being imposed in the most extreme and unusually aggravated cases, in reality
few cases will be considered disproportionate.2 0 In a case where the system
does malfunction, as a result of human error or otherwise, proportionality
review provides a mechanism for the appellate court to weed out inappropriate
24
death verdicts.

1

This protection at the final stage of the capital trial is as essential to the
ultimate goals of fairness and justice as the safeguards in the pre-trial and
trial stages, which are intended to avoid errors. In the short time since New
Jersey has resurrected capital punishment, there have been at least two cases
of wrongly accused death penalty defendants,24 2 a pattern which merely
2 3
replicates the history of capital punishment enforcement in this country. 1
The presence of proportionality review helps insure a system that, to the greatest
24 4
extent possible, avoids arbitrariness and ensures even-handedness.

237. Schwaneberg, supra note 188.
238. N.J. CONST., art VI, § 5, para. 1(c) (1947).
239. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(e).
240. Cf., Pulley, 104 S. Ct. at 888 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that proportionality review is constitutionally required even if it eliminates "only a small part
of the irrationality that infects the current imposition of death sentences throughout
the various states").
241. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 82, at 576. See also Joyner, supra note 216,
at 116 (suggesting that judicial review will actually lead to judicial economy: "(ifl judges
know that their sentencing decisions will be subject to judicial scrutiny, future sentences
may not reflect the disparate character of the past").
242. See, e.g., Leusner, Mistaken Identity: Man Jailed Nine Months Cleared in
Slay Case, Newark Star-Ledger, Jan. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 4; Leusner, PerseveringMom
Helped Clear 'Wrong Man' of Murder, Newark Star-Ledger, Jan. 6, 1984, at 6, col.
1. See also Kaplan, supra note 82, at 570 ("the more people we execute, the greater
the chances of committing an error in one or more of their cases. Moreover, when
we make it easier to apply the death penalty by doing away with 'unnecessary rules',
it may no longer be true - if it is today - that nobody innocent is executed.").
243. See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); 1982 Hearings,
supra note 203, at 21A-22A (testimony of Isadore Zimmerman); 1972 Hearings, supra
note 207, at 13-14 (testimony of Mr. Stephen Nagler).
244. See, e.g., Fahringer, We Who Are About to Die Salute You: Sentencing
in Criminal Cases, 19 TRIAL 72, 77 (1983):
Inequality in sentencing corrodes the basic structural prop of equity supporting our sense of justice. This principle gains its primary impulse from
the constitutional concept of equal protection under the law and a desire to
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The evidence is overwhelming that the death penalty has been applied in
a racially discriminatory manner elsewhere." ' A similar early pattern has
emerged in New Jersey: four of the first five persons sentenced to death in
New Jersey are black.2 46 Although this fact alone does not mean the death
penalty is being administered arbitrarily, it nevertheless raises the spectre of
race discrimination in capital trials in New Jersey. Clearly, some sort of
statutory safeguard is needed so that the penalty is not imposed disproportionately on the basis of race, gender or socio-economic class. 247
Other early death penalty cases in New Jersey reveal an additional distressing pattern: there have been cases where individuals either have been subject
to the death penalty or sentenced to death even though their crimes are factually indistinguishable from those committed by individuals charged with noncapital crimes or sentenced to life. In a Camden County case,2" 8 two
co-defendants were charged with the stabbing murder of the common law husband of the sister of one of the defendants, James Hunt. The victim died
from twenty-four stab wounds, but there was material doubt as to whether
the principal perpetrator was defendant Hunt or the co-defendant. The
co-defendant was allowed to plead guilty and received a life sentence while
Hunt was sentenced to death after a jury trial.
The case of Renee Nicely, the co-defendant in State v. Bass,2" 9 reflects
the same capriciousness. Although her life was spared, that in no way allows
for a prediction that others prosecuted under the death penalty law for crimes
that are identical to those generally treated as non-capital offenses would be
dealt with in a similar fashion. In cases such as Nicely's, proportionality review
would allow the supreme court to consider whether these results are freakishly
disproportionate and violative of the principle of even-handedness that should
underlie any death penalty statute.
It is clear that, in the appropriate circumstances, appellate judges will strain
to find reasons for reversing a conviction or death sentence they feel to be

reduce the appalling disparity in many sentences imposed on defendants who
have committed identical crimes ...
[Sentencing is too often a projection of the judge's own value system....
245. See Pulley, 104 S. Ct. at 887-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and literature cited
therein.
246. Hearings on S. 1479 Before the N.J. Senate Judiciary Comm. 13 (1984)
(testimony of Joseph H. Rodriguez).
247. See, e.g., Jacoby & Paternoster, supra note 193, at 380 ("defendants charged with killing whites were substantially more likely to receive death one found guilty
than were defendants charged with killing blacks").
248. All information on the cases discussed in the text is on file in the Office
of the Public Defender, Trenton, New Jersey, 08625.
249. See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
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disproportionate. Specifically articulated statutory review provisions"' ensure

that this process will be conducted in accordance with prescribed standards.
Such provisions also enable the judiciary to satisfy this concern in an open
manner that preserves the integrity of the entire criminal justice system. Without
this mechanism, courts may be compelled to find procedural error or distort
the law when the real ground for reversal is the judicial belief that the sentence
is too severe. Explicit appellate review of death sentences for disproportionality
"achiev[es] justice in a more direct manner" and allows courts to focus upon
the fundamental issue of "whether the death penalty is unwarranted by the
evidence." 25 '
V.

STATE MODELS FOR PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

In undertaking proportionality review, the New Jersey Supreme Court can
look to the experiences and dilemmas of other states. One of the issues which
often arises under state proportionality review is whether a comparison must
be made on a state-wide basis. A second issue is whether such a comparison
must consider all first degree murder prosecutions or whether the "pool" of
similar cases may be more limited, even to the extent that only affirmed death
penalty cases are used for comparison. The experiences of two states, South
Carolina and Louisiana, illustrate these issues.
In State v. Copeland,252 the South Carolina Supreme Court set out the
scope of the proportionality review required under its statute." 3 The court
stated that three issues must be addressed: first, whether the death sentence
was imposed "under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor"; 25 second, whether the evidence supports the findings of a statutory
aggravating factor;
and third, "[wihether the sentence of death is excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both
the crime and the defendant." '5 6 The third question constitutes the proportionality review and thus is the focus of the inquiry. The court noted that
defining similar cases might be impossible, at least to the extent that a heinous
crime is beyond comparison.2" ' In discussing the United States Supreme Court's

250. See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(e).
251. See Note, supra note 152, at 529.
252. 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1802 (1983).
Defendants Copeland and Roberts were convicted of armed robbery of a gas station,
kidnapping the two men who worked there and shooting them to death. Id. at 576-77,
300 S.E.2d at 66. Later that same night, the defendants robbed another gas station,
kidnapped a worker there and shot him as well. Id.
253. S.C. CODE ANN § 16-3-25(c) (Law. Co-op. Cum. Supp. 1983) requires mandatory review of death sentences by the state supreme court.
254. 278 S.C. at 586, 300 S.E.2d at 72.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.at 587, 300 S.E.2d at 72.
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decisions regarding such review, the court found implicit in these decisions
the tension between the unique consideration in sentencing and the comparison
with similar cases." ' The court stated: "Clearly, a comparative review cannot
be permitted to diminish the particularized quality of sentencing, since the
latter is now an absolute command of the U.S. Constitution." 2" Concluding
that the states have been left to design their own proportionality review, the
court went on to define a procedure which would resolve the uniformindividualized tension. The court began its search for similar cases with cases
in which there was an actual conviction and sentence of death. 6 To expand
the universe of cases, the court reasoned, invites pure conjecture as to why
a jury chose not to give a death sentence. 6 ' The South Carolina Supreme
Court further limited the universe of similar cases to those in which the death
sentence has been upheld on appeal. 62
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision limited the number of cases
to be compared with Copeland's to five.263 The court discussed these five cases
and concluded that none of the previous death sentence cases in South Carolina
was similar to the present case.26 ' The court reached this result despite its
previous declaration that "a meaningful sample [of similar cases] lies ready
'
at hand in . . . cases where the jury has spoken unequivocally." 265
Future
proportionality reviews in South Carolina will be directed toward the particular
circumstances of a crime and the specific character of the defendant, "66 and
comparisons with other cases will be undertaken if possible. 67 The court noted
that its universe of similar cases will expand as more death sentences are
affirmed. 268
In summary, South Carolina's comparative review provides for the comparison of a defendant's sentence with other sentences in cases in which the
crimes shared similar circumstances and the defendants were of a similar
character. Also, the similar case must be one in which the death sentence was
imposed and upheld. 69 Thus, if a defendant in South Carolina is afforded
an adequate proportionality review of his death sentence, it is almost certain
258. Id.
259. Id. at 587-88, 300 S.E.2d at 72.
260. Id. at 591, 300 S.E.2d at 74.
261. Id. Under the South Carolina statute, a jury is not required to state its reasons
for failing to recommend death. Id.
262. Id. at 597, 300 S.E.2d at 75.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 592-95, 300 S.E.2d at 75-77.
265. Id. at 591, 300 S.E.2d at 74. The court stated: "In view of the facts set
forth above, however, we are satisfied that the sentences of death imposed on each
of these appellants was appropriate and neither excessive nor disproportionate in light
of the crime and their respective characters." Id. at 595, 300 S.E.2d at 77.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 596, 300 S.E.2d at 77.
269. South Carolina's statute is identical to Georgia's statute and Louisiana's Rule
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that the court will uphold the sentence; the court would only be comparing
the defendant's case with similar cases in which death sentences were affirmed.
Although the court recognized that a proportionality review is mandated under
the statute, a death sentence may be upheld merely by the court's conclusion
that it was not excessive. South Carolina's scheme fails because the court cannot reconcile the desire for uniform sentencing with the focus on the individual.
This failure is belied by the court's inability to articulate objective factors
which could be used to compare various capital cases.
The problem of finding similar cases has also plagued the Louisiana
Supreme Court. The legislature revamped the Louisiana death penalty statute
after the United States Supreme Court held that the death sentence imposed
in Roberts v. Louisiana... constituted cruel and unusual punishment."'
The new statute was modeled after the Georgia statute upheld in Gregg v.
Georgia.272 Louisiana's statute provides for a bifurcated trial and requires a
jury to find at least one statutory aggravating factor before recommending
a death sentence.27 The Louisiana Supreme Court must review every death
sentence for excessiveness."" The appellate review has been expanded to include
a determination whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalties
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.275
The Louisiana court begins its comparisons by looking at other first degree
murder cases from the same parish or district where the defendant's death
sentence was imposed.276 Uniformity in sentencing is required on a parishwide basis. The court then considers the particular characteristics of the defendant and the murder and compares them with characteristics in the eligible
cases. If these other cases are deemed similar, the court will continue with
the comparison. The difficulty in finding similar cases suggests that this procedure is inadequate to guarantee uniform and consistent sentencing.
A Louisiana case, State v. Sonnier,2" highlights the problems with this
28, yet South Carolina is the only state which begins its search for similar cases with
cases that upheld death sentences.
270. 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (statute imposed a mandatory death sentence).
271. Id. at 336.
272. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
273. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.9 (West 1984).
274. Id.
275. LA. SuP. CT. R. 28 (1978). Section 4(b) requires the district attorney to include

in his sentence review memorandum a synopsis of each first degree murder case in
the district in which sentence was imposed after January 1, 1976.
276. State v. Sonnier, 379 So. 2d 1336, 1362 (La. 1980).
277. 379 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1980), aff'd after remand, 402 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3571 (1983). In this case, two brothers, Elmo, the defendant,

and Eddie Sonnier, kidnapped a young couple while posing as police officers. Id. at
1342. The victims, an 18 year old girl and a 16 year old boy, were driven to an isolated
oilfield where Elmo and then Eddie raped the girl. Id. The girl consented to intercourse with Eddie in exchange for their release. Elmo then forced the two on the ground
and shot both in the back of the head several times, killing them. Id. Eddie Sonnier
held a flashlight while his brother shot the victims. Id.
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procedure. Since there were no other death sentences from the district where
the defendant's death sentence was imposed, the court compared the sentence
with three other first degree murder prosecutions from that parish." 8 The court
decided that none of these other cases was similar to the defendant's case.279
The court concluded: "We are, therefore, unable to say that the sentence is
disproportionate to the penalty in similar cases .. ."280 This conclusion distorts
the purpose of the proportionality review. The court did not test whether the
defendant's death sentence was the sentence a jury would generally impose
in a similar case. In Sonnier's second appeal,28 ' the Louisiana Supreme Court
compared his death sentence with life sentences imposed in two additional
cases and again upheld the death sentence as not disproportionate. 82
Louisiana's appellate review in capital cases is modeled after Georgia's
statute.28 3 The Georgia Supreme Court has chosen to interpret its statute differently from the manner in which the Louisiana Supreme Court has interpreted its statute by requiring state-wide comparison of all similar cases those in which life and death sentences were recommended. 8 This scheme
has the advantage of United States Supreme Court approval. 5 The Georgia
Supreme Court has articulated its test for proportionality as follows: a death
sentence will not be upheld "unless in similar cases throughout the state the
death penalty has been imposed generally .
,,"Il The Louisiana Supreme
278. Id. at 1363. In the first case, the defendant beat a larger man to death with
a club after the two had an altercation. Id. This defendant was convicted of second
degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison. Id. In the second case, the defendant was evicted from his residence because of an argument he had had with another
tenant. Id. The defendant returned to the residence with a gun and beat and then
shot the victim, killing her as she tried to escape. Id. This defendant was convicted
of first degree murder and was sentenced to life in prison. Id. The third case was
that of Eddie Sonnier who was appealing his death sentence. Id. at 1364.
279. Id. The court stated that in the first two cases, the murders occurred after
previous altercations between the defendants and their victims. Id. The court did not
attempt to distinguish Eddie Sonnier's sentence during their appellate review of Elmo
Sonnier's sentence.
280. Id. The court's statement was accurate because, according to the court, there
were no similar cases.
281. 402 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3571 (1983). In the first
appeal, the court affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence because of an error
in the jury instruction. 379 So. 2d at 1369-72. The death sentence was again imposed
by the jury. 402 So. 2d at 653.
282. 402 So. 2d at 661. Sonnier's death sentence was never compared to another
death sentence that the court upheld. Eddie Sonnier's death sentence was reversed by
the Louisiana Supreme Court because he lacked the intent to kill and he played a
relatively minor role in the murders. State v. Sonnier, 380 So. 2d 1, 8-9 (La. 1980).
283. See State v. Sonnier, 379 So. 2d 1336, 1358 (La. 1979). "This is the same
procedure for review authorized by [the] Georgia statute approved by the United States
Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia ....
" Id.
284. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204-06.

285. Id.
286. Moore v. State, 233 Ga. 861, 864, 213 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1975), cert. denied,

428 U.S. 910 (1976).
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Court, which has defended its death penalty statute by noting its similarity
,to Georgia's approved scheme, has failed to follow Georgia's procedures for
appellate review. Sonnier demonstrates the flaws in Louisiana's scheme: not
only was the comparison limited to cases in a particular parish, but Sonnier's
sentence was not shown to be the one imposed generally in similar cases.2"7
Proportionality reviews in Louisiana and South Carolina were designed
to play an important part in eliminating arbitrarily imposed death sentences.
A meaningful comparison of a death sentence with other sentences in similar
cases would allow a court to determine if the jury was justified in pronouncing such a serious penalty and would add predictability to the sentencing procedure. However, the flaws in the administration of comparative reviews by
the courts in South Carolina and Louisiana have rendered the procedures worthless. In neither state can a defendant predict when the appellate court will
find his sentence disproportionate. The decisions as to which cases are similar
are made in an arbitrary manner without identifying objective factors which
distinguish one case from another.2 8 Even though proportionality review is
287. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. The Georgia Supreme Court
would have likely reversed Sonnier's death sentence because in similar cases throughout
the state, the jury has not generally imposed the death sentence.
Louisiana's district-wide comparison has been criticized by Justice Dennis of the
Louisiana Supreme Court. In State v. Prejean, 379 So. 2d 240, 249-52 (La. 1979),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980), Justice Dennis dissented and concluded that Louisiana's appellate review, modeled after Georgia's, constitutionally requires state-wide
proportionality review. The district-wide procedure has also been criticized in Note,
CapitalSentencing Review Under Supreme Court Rule 28, 42 LA. L. REV. 1100, 1117-19
(1982).
The ineffectiveness of Louisiana's parish-wide proportionality review is indicated

by the evidence that disproportionality was a factor in the court's reversal of death
sentences for only one defendant, Eddie Sonnier. 380 So. 2d at 7-8. Disproportionality
has been a factor in reversals of death sentences by the Georgia Supreme Court in
seven cases. See Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252, 258-60, 244 S.E.2d 833, 838-39 (1978);
Ward v. State, 239 Ga. 205, 208-09, 236 S.E.2d 365, 368 (1977); Jarrell v. State, 234
Ga. 410, 424-25, 216 S.E.2d 258, 270 (1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976); Floy
v. State, 233 Ga. 280, 285, 210 S.E.2d 810, 814 (1974), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949
(1977); and Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 127, 210 S.E.2d 659, 667 (death sentence
for armed robbery conviction reversed as being disproportionate but death sentence
for murder is upheld), aff'd, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); contra High v. State, 247 Ga. 289,
297, 276 S.E.2d 5, 14 (proportionality review applied but death sentence upheld), cert.
denied 455 U.S. 927 (1982), rev'd on other grounds in Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373,
290 S.E.2d 442 (1982).
If the Louisiana Supreme Court was performing its review in the manner approved
by the United States Supreme Court, the disparity between its cases and Georgia's,
whose review procedure it adopted, would not be so dramatic.
288. A model for conducting a proportionality review based on objective criteria
was proposed in Baldus, Pulaski, Jr., Woodworth & Kyle, Identifying Comparatively
Excessive Sentences of Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1980).
This model identifies several factors in each case, such as the number of persons killed,
presence of criminal record, and the manner of killing. Id. at 32. These factors are
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not required by the federal Constitution, if Louisiana and South Carolina have
erroneously relied upon the procedure to validate their death statutes and
sentences imposed thereunder, then their death penalty statutes are defective
as applied, and death sentences imposed pursuant to these statutes are
unconstitutionally arbitrary.
Other states will likely face similar problems with performing their proportionality reviews. It is nearly impossible to compare murder cases and then
decide that a life sentence in one case was appropriate while the death sentence
in another was also proper, particularly in states such as New Jersey, where
the supreme court has yet to decide a capital appeal under the new statute.
The New Jersey Supreme Court must conduct a proportionality review if a
death sentence is appealed."0 9 Since there are relatively few death sentences
in New Jersey, the court should be more expansive than the South Carolina
Supreme Court in establishing the "universe of cases" to be used for comparison. If it appears that the case on appeal is more similar to cases in which
defendants received life sentences, the death sentence should be vacated. The
court should be able to articulate objective facts which distinguish the death
sentence case from others with lesser sentences before it can affirm the
irreversible sentence. Consistency and predictability in imposing death sentences
are vital if the system has any hope of eliminating arbitrary decision-making.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Basic to the New Jersey Supreme Court's review of death sentences must
be the realization that capital prosecution is the limited, narrow exception
whereby less than one percent of all murder cases will produce a death sentence
to review.2 90 Therefore, the basic universe of comparison must be all homicide
cases arising since the effective date of our capital statute, not just those tried
as capital cases. Such a review will expose those cases capitally prosecuted
which are disproportionate by comparison to factually similar cases. It will
also insure that the ultimate penalty is imposed only in the exceptional case.
This is the touchstone of a constitutionally acceptable scheme for proportionality review purposes.
To this end, the New Jersey Supreme Court should welcome the use of

ranked in order of importance to a sentencing jury. Id. at 34. A percentage of defendants who receive the death sentence where each factor in present or absent is then
determined. Id. at 40-45. By examining objective factors, similar cases are identified
and statistically evaluated to determine if there was consistency in sentencing. One
problem with this model is that it is often impossible to determine how a particular

factor influenced a jury. Another problem, which would prevent the states from adopting the model, is that the model provides too much uniformity and statistical evaluation and eliminates the focus on the individual defendant and crime. Statistical models
cannot be reconciled with constitutionally mandated individualized sentencing.

289. N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2C:l1-3(e) (West 1982).

290. See supra note 184.
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mathematical as well as statistical models involving scientific techniques to
aid it in analyzing a death case for disproportionality. Because life is at stake,
the proportionality review of a sentence of death must be unrestricted and
creative, or impermissible considerations of race, sex, or socio-economic status
will infect the jury decision of who shall live and who shall die.
Proportionality review is embedded deeply in the fabric of New Jersey
law. Its roots are found in the state constitution, in decisional law, and in
the state criminal justice system's long-standing and fundamental commitment
to fairness in the criminal process. It assures that a sense of proportion, balance
and equity is an indispensable part of any application of the New Jersey death
penalty statute. Nothing in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pulley
29
v. Harris
' suggests that evisceration of the proportionality requirement is
either mandated or wise. In the wake of Pulley, an effort has begun to eliminate
proportionality review in New Jersey. That effort is short-sighted and contrary to the intentions of the state legislature's articulated attempts to draft
a statute which insures fundamental fairness prior to the imposition of the
death penalty.292
Elements of prejudice and irrationality exist throughout our society. Their
continued existence, while strengthening our resolve to eradicate them, also
serves to highlight the realization that they will continue to infect the fair
administration of justice. In death penalty litigation, no execution must be
permitted to occur where the underlying conviction and/or jury determination of death is infected by prejudice or by irrationality. Toward this end,
proportionality review of the sentence of death by the New Jersey Supreme
Court will eliminate such unfairness in this State.
291. 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984).
292. It should be noted that the proportionality requirement was added to the
death penalty bill by the State Judiciary Committee as the result of an amendment
proposed by the State Attorney General:
[W]e would like to suggest that in addition to the other matters that the
Supreme Court consider in its review of cases where the death penalty has
been imposed, that the court consider the proportionalityof the death sentences
which have been imposed throughout the State, that is, to make sure that
these sentences are being meted out in a fair, even-handed way throughout

the State, and that we do not have either classes of individuals or areas in
the State which appear to be arbitrary one way or the other.
1982 Hearings, supra note 203, at 6 (testimony of Mr. Stier) (emphasis added). Senator

John Russo, then-chairman of the Judiciary Committee, indicated that any death penalty
statute must "cover every possible contingency for the protection of the defendant
and hopefully ...

will be utilized only in the most extreme cases." Id. at 1. In response

to testimony by former Public Defender Stanley C. Van Ness, Senator Russo noted
that he attempted to "draw this bill so tight and so limited that at least [the] risk
[of convicting an innocent person] will be minimized." Id. at 30.
In his statement accompanying the enactment of the bill into law, Gov. Thomas
Kean emphasized the proportionality requirement as one which would "ensure fairness
and equity under the new statute." Governor's Statement (August 6, 1982), at 1.

